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ABSTRACT  
The aim of this research is to investigate the influence of gender of the board of directors 
on the financial performance of Australian publicly listed companies, in order to establish 
if there is a relationship between the number and percentage of women on the board and 
firm’s financial performance.  The starting point for this study is to understand the board 
of directors and their responsibilities, then to investigate some of the previous studies in 
this field and their findings. Using the resource based theory the hypothesis that firms 
employing greater percentage of women on their boards will experience relatively better 
financial performance is developed.  
The findings identify that the number and percentage of women on board have a positive 
relationship with firm’s financial performance in three of four of the financial measures 
that have been tested (net profit after tax, increase on total equity, capital increase and 
market value). 
The study also indicates that the number and percentage of women on Australian boards 
remains low compared with other countries like US, UK and Canada. The study 
considers some of the reasons behind the low representation on women on Australian 
boards and suggests ways for women and companies to improve this percentage.     
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1. Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1. Introduction  
From the perspective of the Resource Based Theory, the overall objective of the study is 
to test for relationship between the gender of the board directors and corporate financial 
performance.  
Bosch (1995) defined board of directors as the peak governing body of a company that is 
responsible for the continuing success of the organisation. This emphasises that directors 
wield ultimate power and influence over the direction of the company, with ramifications 
for shareholders, employees and the industry (Bosch 1996). Through board initiatives and 
approvals, company policy and procedures are created or changed, new products are 
developed, and new markets are entered (Elgart 1983).  
The board is viewed as a key element of corporate governance, acting as a formal link 
between shareholders and managers of companies (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan, 2004). The 
board plays a critical role in monitoring management and in providing strategic direction 
for the firm (Shrader and Blackburn, 1997). Active board members help firms gain access 
to important resources (Shrader et al., 1991). 
Maitland (2009) suggested that having a gender mix on the board of directors is 
invariably better than a single gender board as it encourages people to air different 
opinions from their gender perspectives. If half the people the board is serving are 
women (half of the employees, customers and investors) and no women are on the board 
to offer a view, that's a very distorted picture the company risks creating (Maitland 2009). 
It has been argued that there is a powerful business case for why corporate boards should 
bring more women to the board table (Stephenson 2004) (details of why boards need 
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more women can be found in table 2.1). Companies with women board members can 
expect significantly higher returns and better overall financial performance for a number 
of reasons including, gender diversity at the board level solve problems faster and more 
effectively than like-minded boards (Dobbin and Jung 2007). Gender diversity at the 
board level brings different perspectives to the table and improves communication (Dobbin 
and Jung 2007) (details of the skills that women can bring to the board and how these 
skills can improve financial performance of companies can be found in table 2.2). It also 
sends a powerful message to the women who already work for their organizations that their 
contributions are valuable – that their voices are heard. It demonstrates to employees, 
investors and other stakeholders that diversity truly matters to their corporate success 
(Stephenson 2004). More women representation also translates into improved risk 
management and audit control, increased ethical oversight and a broader, more accurate 
assessment of the company's success (Stephenson 2004). When companies bring together 
a diversity of people - especially at the board level, ideas flow, innovation soars, 
improved strategies emerge, and better decisions are made (Stephenson 2004). A virtuous 
circle of continuous learning is created and sustained. In an economy where knowledge 
drives results, diversity is a precious asset (Stephenson 2004). 
Increasing the presence of women in the boardroom may be considered as a business 
imperative: adding women on boards can have an important signalling effect to 
employees, shareholders, and the external business community (Huse and Solberg 2006). 
Daily and Dalton (2003) argued that women may add unique perspectives, experiences 
and work styles as compared with their male counterparts. Smith, Smith and Verner 
(2006) show that, whilst various efforts have been undertaken to increase the number of 
women on corporate boards the representation of women corporate directors shows little 
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change during the latest decade, there has been an increasing focus on the gender of top 
executives and boards of directors of firms.    
The proportion of women reaching board positions is still very low in most countries, 
though it has been increasing, for instance, in the US and in some European countries. 
Norway legislation mandates 40 per cent women's representation on boards from 2005 
(Daily and Dalton, 2003, p. 8; Fouché, 2005).  
The objective of this research is to examine the impact of female presence on the board of 
directors on the firm’s financial performance in Australian listed companies. A major 
point to be considered is that we are not arguing that women board members are better 
than men board members; but we are arguing that they are different. There for they can 
bring different perspectives and new ideas. These perspectives and new ideas can 
improve decision making, risk management and learning environment of the company 
then that can lead to better financial performance.      
 
1.1 Background   
Women participation in the workforce has been greater than ever, however, women 
representation at the board level remains low across all industries in Australia, Wood and 
Jogulu (2006) noted glacial progress. In 2004 3% of ASX200 CEOs and 8.2% of 
ASX200 board directors were women; in 2006 there remained 3% women ASX200 
CEOs and 8.7% women board directors, (Wood and Jogulu 2006). When comparing 
these percentages with other countries like Sweden and Norway, that introduced 
regulations of the gender composition of the boards of directors in order to improve equal 
opportunities. In Norway, the government decided that for large Norwegian firms at least 
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40% of the members of the boards of directors must be women in 2005. This seems to 
have had a major impact on the recruitment practices for Norwegian board members, see 
Hoel (2005). According to Hoel, the proportion of women in Norwegian listed firms 
increased from about 6% in 2000 to 22% in 2005. This clearly indicates that the 
percentage of women on Australian boards remains low and Australian women have had 
a tough time getting seats at the boardroom table.   
 
1.2  Aims  
The aim of this research is to examine the gender make up of the board of directors of the 
Top 350 Australian listed companies for the period 2000-2007, to investigate any 
relationship between gender at the board level and the financial performances of these 
companies. 
The financial performance measures that will be examined in this study will include: 
Annual Net Profit, Annual Capital Increase, Annual Increase on total Equity and Market 
Value.   
Detailed analysis consisted of examining:   
 The percentage of women on the board of directors  
 The number of women on the board of directors 
These variables were compared against the financial performance of the Australian listed 
companies over the years from 2000-2007.  
Another detailed analysis looked at any differences on the industry level.   
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1.3 The Research Question   
The central question investigated in this thesis is:  
Does the gender at the board level affect the financial performance of 
Australian publicly listed companies?  
The research focus is on women board member on Australian boards and their skills that 
make them valuable board member. It also allows for a comparison of the experiences 
and differences between women and men board members and whether these sets of skills 
and experiences have any impact on the financial performance of companies. This 
research is investigating the differences between women board members and men board 
members and how the difference between the two might have a positive impact on the 
companies rather than which one is better. 
The research is guided by the following supplementary questions:  
 Are there any industry differences between gender at the board 
level and financial performance of Australian publicly listed 
companies? 
 What kind of skills women can bring to the board of directors that 
makes their presence on board of directors is valuable to 
companies?   
 Why do boards need more than one woman on the board table? 
1.4  Motivations and Contribution of the Study   
Australia’s female representation in corporate boards continues to lag behind that of our 
leading trading nations, the United States and the United Kingdom, (EOWA 2006). 
Hence Australia may have had less effective boards, resulting in lesser performance. A 
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well-researched study can be helpful in changing companies attitudes towards hiring 
more women on boards and raising performance financial performance of companies.   
 Women leaders and women on boards comprise a growing, and perhaps until this time         
overlooked resource for firms. We feel that it is now feasible as well as appropriate to test 
for women in leadership/boards and performance relationships.   
Very limited academic research has been done in Australia in this area. On the other hand 
few industrial research has been conducted that managed to find a relationship between 
WOB  and firm financial performance, (e.g. She means business sponsored by Sunday 
Life Magazine 2007 and she means business sponsored by the Sunday Morning Health 
2006 both by Karren Brady). There is room for a good academic research study to 
investigate further these limited findings.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The underutilization of women in management in a period of great change and uncertainty 
is a national economic problem. 
 
1.5  Limitations of the Study 
1. Variables like size of company were not included as control variables because it 
could limit the sample. The repeated measures (or panel) form of the data can be 
analysed in such terms that effectively control for company specific factors (like 
Size).  The sample is analysed by investigating each company on its own over the 
eight years period for a board gender effect, then combining all companies to test for 
an overall effect. For analysis it is very important for this investigation to have a big 
sample to find what may be a small effect.      
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2. The year 2008 was not included in the sample because of the global economic 
recession. This financial crisis affected most companies all around the world 
negatively; many companies made huge financial losses or have gone out of the 
stock exchange market completely. Australian Public companies were caught up in 
these problems as well; therefore it is important to exclude this year from our sample 
because it may affect the results.   
 
1.6  Overview of the Study  
Following this introductory chapter, chapter two provides a review of the literature on 
women on boards, their participation in the boardrooms and how that participation can 
affect the financial performance of firms based on previous studies in this area. Chapter 
three covers the theories and arguments that have been used in the past to measure 
women on board and financial performance of companies. The theories that are covered 
in this chapter are the Liberal Feminist Theory (LFT), Social Feminist Theory (SFT) and 
the Resource Based theory (RBT). Leading to chapter four that covers the development 
of the hypotheses and describes the methods used to collect the financial data employed 
in this research and the analyses undertaken to test the hypotheses developed in the 
previous chapter. Chapter five discuss the findings and the hypotheses tests and results. 
Chapter six covers some recommendations for future research and the conclusion of the 
research  goes through all the results and findings from chapter five in depth to lead in the 
discussion and to conclude if the number or percentage of women on boards affects the 
financial performance of companies.  
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1.7  Definitions of Terms  
 (RBT):Resource Based theory 
 (LFT):Liberal feminist theory  
 (SFT): Social feminist theory  
 (ROE): Return on Equity 
 (NPAT): Net Profit After Tax 
 (CI): Capital Increase 
 (BMV): Business Market Value 
 (WOB): Women on Board 
 
1.8  Summary  
This chapter has presented the background and need of the study, research question and 
research aim. In addition stated that the purpose of this study is to investigate the 
differences between women and men board members and how these differences can help 
improve financial performance of companies. Then as part of this investigation we 
created few tables in chapter two to discuss these differences and how these differences 
can have positive impact on companies.  This Chapter also stated that very limited 
academic research has been done to investigate Australian women on board and financial 
performance of companies as a reason for to the research.   
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2. Chapter Two: Literature Review  
2.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, the literature on women and their participation on corporate boards is 
examined.  
The focus in the chapter is on three interrelated themes that develop in the literature: 
women’s potential contributions at board level, gender differences in management, 
leadership and directorship style in depth and why having more women on board can 
improve corporate financial performance.  
Women make up about half of the workforce in most developed countries yet they 
comprise fewer than 5% of senior executive and board of directors’ roles (Tharenou 1999 
and Diamond 2007). Ragins, Townsend and Mattis (1998) suggest that while women are 
flooding the managerial pipeline, their efforts to attain the more senior levels are being 
blocked. Rindfleish (2002) argues that women’s participation in the paid workforce has 
been one of the most remarkable social changes over the past 40 years, yet women are 
excluded from the most senior positions within organisations or their boards (Diamond 
2007).        
The term ‘glass ceiling’ was first used in 1986 in a special report in the Wall Street 
Journal on the status of corporate women (Hymowitz and Schellhardt 1986) to describe 
the corporate traditions, practices and prejudices that blocked women in organisations. 
The term ‘glass ceiling’ is now used extensively in the literature and refers to the barriers 
that keep women and minorities from rising above a certain level in organisations 
(Davidson and Cooper 1992, Coe 1992, Adler 1993, Cassel and Walsh 1994, and 
Diamond 2007) 
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Over the past 20 years the number of women executives and board directors has 
increased in Australia by only one to two percent to form 5% of board’s positions 
(Tharenou 1999 and Diamond 2007).   
2.2. Gender Diversity in the boardroom and corporate 
performance 
Women are participating in the workforce in greater numbers than ever before. Diverse 
boards should more accurately reflect this changed workforce demographic. Women on 
boards may not only benefit company profitability (as indicated in table 2), but contribute 
in other intangible, yet important, ways. Putting women on boards provides positive role 
models to young women and can result in the attraction and retention of diverse staff, and 
better staff morale (Arfken, Bellar and Helms 2004).  
To be able to investigate the impact of gender diversity of the board of directors on the 
company, it is appropriate to consider what are the responsibilities of the board of 
directors, to be able to understand why it is important to have female directors on boards. 
From there we will focus on female directors’ participation in the board room.  
2.2.1. Responsibilities of the BOD  
Boards of directors exist to help management develop business strategies and to set 
policy objectives. Boards often select the chief executive of the corporation and, through 
their regular meetings, ensure effective planning and resource management. In addition, 
they oversee the adherence to regulatory requirements and monitor financial performance 
(Arfken, Bellar and Helms 2004). Bosch (1995) defined a board of directors as the peak 
governing body of a company that is responsible for the continuing success of the 
organisation. Bosch (1996) emphasised that directors wield ultimate power and influence 
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over the direction of the company, with ramifications for shareholders, employees and the 
industry. Elgart (1983) described how through board initiatives and approvals, company 
policy and procedures are created or changed, new products developed, and new markets 
entered.  
The board is viewed as a key element of corporate governance, acting as a formal link 
between shareholders and managers of companies (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan, 2004).  
Burgess (2003) suggested that the knowledge, skills and abilities of directors largely 
determine the quality of board decisions and commitment of the directors. To maintain 
and enhance the quality of corporate governance, it is important for the composition of 
the board of directors to reflect current knowledge and business practices (Gillies 1992).  
The definitions of the roles of directors are broad, involving many and varied tasks, 
situations, and relationships (Burgess 2003). Izraeli and Talmud (1998) stated that a 
director needs to demonstrate accountability to stakeholders, and contribute to the 
resolution of internal problems and conflicts in the organisation.  
Directors of corporate boards perform three fundamental functions: monitoring or 
control, service or advice, and resource dependence or resource acquisition (Lorsch & 
Maclver, 1989). In the monitoring or control role, directors act as representatives or 
fiduciaries of the stockholders, ensuring that the CEO and top management performance 
reflects external interests. The service or advice role is based on directors holding 
relevant and related experience to guide corporate strategy and advise the CEO and top 
managers on administrative and other managerial issues. 
Increasing the variety of people who serve on boards is important because it offers the 
opportunity to tap into a rich pool of talented candidates, bringing new voices, 
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experiences and approaches to the decision-making process (Braund 2005). It will also 
help to add depth to existing skills and ideas and, perhaps most importantly, bring the 
board closer to properly representing its stakeholders.  
2.2.2. Gender diversity on the BOD 
Supporting this argument a study by the Conference Board of Canada (2001) tracked 
corporations and found that those with two or more women on the board in 1995 were far 
more likely to be industry leaders in revenues and profits six years later, in 2001. 
In another study Catalyst (2005), released the results of a study of 353 Fortune 500 
companies. They were able to demonstrate a direct link between corporate performance 
and gender diversity. They were able to provide evidence that the group of companies 
with the largest number of women in senior management had a 36% higher return on 
investment than the quartile with the lowest female representation.  
 These studies are indicators and evidence that woman in the executive suite correlate to 
high profits. The results showed a clear pattern. Fortune 400 firms with a high number of 
WOB outperformed their industry median firms. The firms with the best scores for 
promoting women were consistently more profitable than those whose scores were 
merely good (Adler 2002). 
Catalyst (2004) looked at connecting corporate performance and gender diversity. The 
study used publicly available data to explore the link between gender diversity in the top 
management teams and US corporate financial performance in the second half of the 
1990s. Catalyst used two measures to examine the financial performance: Return on 
Equity (ROE) and Total return on Shareholders’ funds (TRS). Upon examining 353 
Fortune 500 companies Catalyst found a connection between gender diversity and 
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financial performance. The study also confirmed that this connection between gender 
diversity and financial performance is evident overall and for the majority of industries 
for which they had enough data to study. 
The companies examined have average revenues of 13.5 billion and an average market 
value of 21.3 billion. These companies were representative of all Fortune 500 companies 
between 1996 and 2000.  
Overall the sample divided into the following 11 industries: aerospace and defence, 
consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials, health care, industries, 
information technology/telecommunication services, materials, pharmaceuticals and 
utilities. 
The key findings of the study:  
 The group of companies with the highest representation of women on their top 
management teams and BOD experienced better financial performance than the 
group of companies with the lowest women’s representation. This finding holds 
for both financial measures analysed: Return on Equity (ROE), which is 35.1 
percent higher, and total Return to shareholders (TRS), which is 34.0 percent 
higher.  
 Financial performance was also analysed by industry, and in each of the five 
industries analysed, the group companies with the highest women’s representation 
on their top management teams experienced a higher ROE than the group of 
companies with the lowest women’s representation  
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 In four out of the five industries analysed, the group of companies with the 
highest women’s representation on their top management teams experienced a 
higher TRS than the group of companies with the lowest women’s representation  
 Catalyst Award-winning companies’ financial performance outperformed others 
in the sample (Catalyst 2004). 
2.2.3. Women on board – gender values.  
Having a visibly diverse board signals that the organisation takes diversity seriously and 
that these different perspectives and viewpoints are given a voice at the board level 
(Allen 2004). Gender and visible diversity on the board and executive team is a step in 
the right direction towards attracting and retaining diverse talent. Not surprisingly CEOs 
report that having women on boards contributes to positive attitudes with female 
employees.  
To go behind such results, it is necessary to look at reasons why women on boards could 
lead to higher financial performance. 
The following table shows some of the main views of why boards need more women. 
The compilation draws on Ourcommunity.com.au (2007), Rosener (1995), Braund 
(2005), Burgess (2003), Huse (2006), Konrad and Kramer (2006), and Spurgeon and 
Gross (2005).  
Table 2-1 Views on women differences on BOD 
 
 Views The Influence on BOD Source 
1.  New experiences and 
perspectives 
Bring new voices, experiences and 
approaches to the decision-making 
process which may add depth to 
existing skills and ideas and, perhaps 
most importantly, bring the board 
closer to properly representing its 
stakeholders because women represent 
a high percentage of stakeholders.  
Rosener (1995)  
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2.  New experience, 
knowledge and contacts  
The connections of its members can be 
among a board's greatest assets Along 
with their different experiences and 
perspectives; women will also inevitably 
bring new knowledge and contacts to a 
board. 
Braund (2005), 
Burgess (2003) 
3.  Communication skills, 
knowledge, community 
issues, ethical and less 
competitive. 
Many people believe that there are a 
range of qualities that only women can 
bring to a boardroom – things like 
better communication and consultation 
skills, a more "caring" attitude towards 
the organisation they are governing, a 
better knowledge of community issues, 
and so on. Some people have even 
suggested that women have a greater 
propensity for more ethical behaviour, 
being less competitive and less likely to 
be driven by money. 
Spurgeon & 
Gross (2005), 
Burgess(2003) 
and Huse (2006)  
 
4.  Representation Boards are put in place to oversee an 
organisation or facility and to provide 
leadership. They govern for the benefit 
of, and are therefore accountable to, 
the community at large. Women 
therefore represent a big chunk of any 
board's stakeholders – and it is difficult 
to represent this important group's 
views and needs without giving women 
a place at the board table. 
 
Having women on the board also makes 
a strong statement about the 
organisation's willingness to seek out 
and take into account the views of all of 
its stakeholders. 
Ourcommunity.c
om.au (2007), 
Braund (2005) 
and Burgess 
(2003) 
5.  Ethical and equality.  Many organisations pay lip-service to 
equality but in practice, this cannot 
occur unless power is shared equally 
with women – and that means offering 
them (and welcoming them into) a 
place on the board. 
Huse (2006), , 
and Spurgeon & 
Gross (2005). 
6.  Governance 
experiences.  
Many for-profit companies are 
discovering that it makes good business 
sense to have women on their boards. 
Indeed, studies have shown a 
connection between organisational 
performance – both financial and non-
financial – and greater numbers of 
women in positions of power.  
 
Having more women on boards means a 
greater diversity of skills, experiences, 
opinions and strategies – and that 
means better governance. And better 
governance inevitably means better 
results. 
Rosener (1995), 
Braund (2005) 
and Burgess 
(2003) 
7.  Broaden boards 
discussions 
Women directors extend boards' 
discussions to better represent the 
concerns of a wide set of stakeholders, 
including employees, customers, and 
the community at large.  
 
Women directors can be more dogged 
than men in pursuing answers to 
difficult questions (possibly because, as 
one male CEO put it, the men feel a 
gender obligation to behave as though 
they understand everything). 
Konrad and 
Kramer (2006) 
8.  Collaborative 
approach  
Women directors tend to bring a more 
collaborative approach to boards, which 
improve communication among 
directors and between the board and 
management. 
Konrad and 
Kramer (2006) 
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Complied also from the above sources, the following table shows some of the main skills 
that women can bring to the boardroom and how these skills can benefit the decision 
making that will lead to improved financial performance  
 
Table 2-2 Skills women can bring to the boardroom 
 
 Skills  Women board members 
contributions  
Impact on 
company 
Reference 
1.  Women are 
flexible and deal 
well with 
uncertainty 
Evidence that women on board can 
actually enhance the firm's 
capabilities to be flexible and deal 
with uncertainty 
 
 This may improve 
risk management 
and audit control  
Rosener 
(1995) 
2.  Women are 
strong in the 
areas of idea 
generation and 
innovation 
More and more women assume 
leadership, boards and management 
positions, organizational learning, 
climate, and performance might 
improve.  
If organizational 
learning climate 
improve then 
performance may 
improve as well.  
Rosener 
(1995) 
3.  Diversity  Female board members bring 
diverse viewpoints to the boardroom 
and may provoke lively boardroom 
discussions.  
Different viewpoints 
might ensure that 
important details are 
not overlooked. This  
may improve firm’s 
performance. 
Allen 
(2006) 
4.  Women are more 
transformational 
than men 
It has been argued that women 
encouraged participation in power 
and information and sought to 
enhance the status of employees. 
This skill may 
encourage 
employees to raise 
their voice with idea 
and innovation and 
make them feel 
responsible for 
improving company 
performance.    
Spurgeon 
& Cross 
(2005) 
5.  Women tend to 
be more 
nurturing, caring 
and sensitive 
than men 
These characteristics are more 
aligned with transformational 
leadership 
More likely to 
generate extra effort 
from employees that 
and might improve 
financial 
performance.  
Bass and 
Avolio 
(1996) 
6.  Social skills Women can draw on their social 
skills to transform individual self-
interest into a desire to achieve 
organizational goals. 
Improve decision 
making and 
performance  
Bass and 
Avolio 
(1996) 
8.  Participative style Their more participative style is 
helpful to employees in new or 
changing circumstances, enabling 
creative response to change. 
Generate extra 
effort from their 
subordinates’ co-
workers. This may 
lead to better 
decision making and 
that may lead to 
improve financial 
performance of 
firms.  
Nichols 
(1993) 
9.  Good at juggling 
and think 
strategically 
Research suggests it’s also women’s 
ability to keep many balls in the air 
that makes them effective board 
members. 
As a result, decision 
making will be 
improved and that 
may lead to improve 
financial 
Lynch 
(2006) 
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performance of 
firms.  
 
 
 
So why are woman often overlooked for board positions? Politically correct chairpersons 
often say that they want more women, but can't find quality candidates. The reason that is 
normally given is that there is an insufficient supply of senior executive women with 
experience comparable to male board members (Allen & Zehnder 2007). It’s been argued 
“but how can she be an effective non-executive director if she has never been a CEO of a 
publicly listed company?" Currently board members are drawn almost exclusively from 
executive ranks (Allen & Zehnder 2007). Women are seen to learn the experience and 
skills needed for corporate boards. But one can argue that it is a normal and healthy state 
to have a mixture of direct management experience and other experiences, be that from 
professional services careers or other relevant backgrounds.  
CEO of the Harvard Group, Vince Caracio, said, "until five years ago boards of directors 
were three adjectives: male, pale and stale (Allen and Zehnder 2006, 2007, para. 11). "Of 
course there is nothing wrong with being older, white and a man. But this is not the 
point" (Allen & Zehnder 2007, para. 14). When all board members are cut from the same 
cloth the board can become an old boys’ network, which is widely acknowledged as a 
major cause of ineffective boards, poor governance and some of the most spectacular 
failures of governance (Allen & Zehnder 2007). Board processes differ when diverse 
perspectives are brought to the boardroom table. "And these differences in process lead to 
differences in outcomes" (Allen & Zehnder 2007, para. 14). Divergence of views can 
lead to constructive dissent and debate behind the boardroom door and encourages good 
due diligence in decision making. But to have this there must be a belief that different 
insights, skill and experiences are valuable to the organisation and can contribute to 
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business growth. The argument here is that the homogenous board lacks diversity and 
therefore meaningful dissent or deliberation (Allen & Zehnder 2007). "Diversity in 
gender as well as background is very good for a board to get multiple perspectives and a 
diversity of views" (Allen & Zehnder 2007).  
If hiring for "fit" brings on like minded people who can get along with the rest of the 
team, the flip side is that this can be a hindrance to breakthrough ideas (Allen & Zehnder 
2007, para. 15). As Sonnenfeld (2002) said, the best boards know how to have a good 
fight. Diversity in experiences, skills, viewpoints, perspectives, talents, ideas is a positive. 
Diversity is about enriching the leadership platform with different perspectives by having 
a team of people with different frames of reference. How well can board members with 
mostly similar experiences and backgrounds ensure that the full range of strategic risks 
facing their organisation have been identified? The same questions apply to other 
management themes like managing change, and managing innovation etc (Allen & 
Zehnder 2007).   
When Jill Kerr Conway had just left being President of Smith College in the US and was 
the sole female director at Nike in the early 90s she suggested that the company launch a 
female sports apparel division. Today this division accounts for a large amount of Nike's 
revenue. 
This is one of many examples where a different set of backgrounds, a different set of 
ideas can create profitable change. 
But getting to the top is not simply about excelling at what you do; says Baker, partner 
and board member at Clayton Utz legal firm “A lot of people think that if you work hard 
enough, good think will happen. In my experience, that’s not how it happens. You need 
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to be talented, have the right skills, think laterally and be in the right place at the right 
time.”  
According to research commissioned by the US Federal Office of the Status of women in 
2004, under the auspices of lobby group women on boards, publicly listed companies of 
the USA account for approximately 10,000 board positions, 1.4 percent of which become 
vacant each year. However, with sitting members often reapplying for membership, the 
number of vacancies for new members is closer to 100 places per year (Douglas 2005). 
About 7 percent of these board positions are taken by women, and even if the recruitment 
rate of women to boards were to double, that would leave only about 14 positions open. 
Half of the 2,000 women who have registered with women on boards have expressed 
interested in a board career. That's 1.4 positions per 100 women. After 20 years of 
recruiting for and participating on numerous boards, Heidrick & Struggles partner David 
Pumphrey says smart companies are now actively recruiting women to their boards. 
"Boards are only successful if the dynamics are right," he says. "If you can get a mix of 
people you have more scope (Douglas 2005. Para 4).  
Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997), tried to provide conceptual arguments and 
empirically explore the firm-level relationships of women in management with financial 
performance outcomes.  
The study justified and builds on the assumption that firms employing more women 
managers have probably done a better job of recruiting capable managers from the total 
available talent pool, and consequently will be in a better position to link with customers, 
employees, and other constituencies. Firms employing higher percentages of women are 
likely to perform better inasmuch as they are more progressive and more competitive 
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because their management contingents more closely mirror the composition of existing 
markets.  
Rationale for these arguments is found in the resource-based theory of competitive 
advantage and strategy analysis (e.g., Barney, 1991, 1997; Grant, 1991). Basically, 
according to Barney (1997), the resource-based theory argues that it is not industry 
structure that leads to competitive advantage and better performance rather; it is the 
ability to capitalize on and apply the firm's internal resources in uncertain and dynamic 
industry contexts. We will return to the resource based theory of competitive advantage 
in depth in the theories section of this thesis.   
Women can draw on their social skills to transform individual self-interest into a desire to 
achieve organizational goals. Their more participative style of leadership is helpful to 
employees in new or changing circumstances, enabling everyone to respond creatively to 
change. Through transformational leadership, women use their work achievements, 
contacts and power based on their personality, rather than power based on authority or 
position, to feel confident. Finally, women appeal to the intrinsic rewards that employees 
will discover, as these are more empowering than, for example, more pay 
(Venkateswaran 2007). 
According to Nichols (1993), women managers will redefine managerial work and will 
provide firms with opportunities to capitalize on the challenging contexts they face. 
Zellner (1994) further notes that women are starting new businesses at a rate nearly twice 
that of men, and are "bringing to the table" skills such as team building and employee 
development that are very much in tune with today's competitive realities. 
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2.3. Profile of Australian company directors 
The percentage of women on Australian boards is still very low. Most boards are made 
up of men because candidates are recruited traditionally from within their own social 
circles. In Australia there is no quota system mandating a ratio of women represented on 
boards. Medd (the Executive and Chair of the Women on Boards program in Australia, 
President of the National Foundation for Australian women, Chair of Australian Ethical 
Superannuation Ltd and a director and chair of the Finance Committee of The Infants 
Home, Ashfield) doesn’t believe we need one. It’s a simple matter, she says, of creating a 
meritocracy. “I think there should be a key performance indicator system in place where 
women are assessed on their performance.”  
Beside the arguments listed above, another argument for aiming at a more diverse 
composition of board members is that if only male individuals are potential candidates 
for the boards, the selection of board members will take place from only this selected 
distribution of qualifications, and on average this implies a much lower quality than if the 
candidates are selected among the best from the distribution of both men and women 
(Smith, Smith and Verner 2005). 
Before summarising this chapter it’s important to discuss the profile of women on the 
Australian boards, which will indicate how low is the representation of women on boards 
and how this percentage is not increasing much over the years. Focusing on the Top 500 
Australian listed companies, (women on boards.org.au 2001) conducted a two year study 
of board membership in Australia and interviews with almost 50 women who sit on 
public company boards. It identified that women are still a small minority of board 
directors, and that not all boards are welcoming or receptive to change.  
22 
 
Some facts in 2001: 
 Women hold only 162 positions of a total of 3,312, that is, around 
5%.  
 Most (71%) Australian companies still have no woman on the 
board, and of those that do, the profile is of one woman, working 
with seven male peers around the board table.  
 Fourteen of the Top 500 companies have two women on the board, 
and the average board size in these companies increases to nine, so 
in these boardrooms, while two women sit at the table, they are  
seven male peers.  
 Three companies of the Top 500 have three women on the board, 
and one company has four. All of these boards are larger than the 
norm, with eleven directors each, on average.  
 Far from the boardrooms of Australia being swamped by women, 
the composition remains remarkably similar to that of ten years 
ago, when about the same percentage of non-executive directors 
was female. It seems that this is unlikely to change in the 
immediate short term.  
 
In 2002 fewer than 10% of Australia’s company directors were women and fewer than 
2% came from minority ethnic groups. Research commissioned in 2003 by women on 
boards of 412 Australian organisations, including 338 of the top 500 publicly listed 
companies showed: 
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 7% of all board members were women  
 29% of boards had one female board member  
 6% of boards had two female board members  
 2% of boards had three female board members  
 3% of public companies and associations had female Chairs  
 37% of the first 175 public companies and 73% of the next 325 
companies had no female board members  
2006 EOWA Census of women in leadership measured the percentage of women on 
boards and women executive managers in Australia's top 200 organisations listed on the 
Australian Stock Exchange the key findings were:  
- Women comprise 47% of Australia's employees and 40% of its 
shareholders.  
- 12% of executive managers in ASX 200 companies are women 
(compared to 11.4% in 2004).  
- Of the 200 companies studied, 39.5% had no women executives at 
all (compared to 40.6 % in 2004).  
- Only six ASX companies are led by women, which translates as 33 
male chief executives to every one female chief executive (those 
with female CEOs are GasNet Australia Group, Harvey Norman 
Holding, Macquarie Airports, Macquarie Countrywide Trust, St 
George Bank and NZ Telecom).  
- Only 8.7% of board seats are filled by women 
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Wood (2006) argued that the census reveals slow progress. In 2004 3% of ASX200 CEOs 
and 8.2% of ASX200 board directors were women; in 2006 there remained 3% women 
ASX200 CEOs and 8.7% women board directors. And again if we compare 2001 with 
2006 we will not find a big difference. It may take many more years for women to 
achieve equal status with men in the corporate world. 
     
2.4. Summary 
This chapter outlined some of views in relation to gender diversity at the board level, and 
women potential contributions in the boardroom and outlined some of the skills that 
women can bring to the boardroom then how these skills might benefit firms and improve 
financial performance.  
This chapter also summarised the profile of Australian women on boards as a statement 
of how low the percentage is compared to the total directors. The profile also presents the 
percentages over few years to give the opportunity to compare the percentages. This 
didn’t show a big difference for example, if we compare the percentages of 2001 with the 
percentages of 2006 there is no significant change.      
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3. Chapter three: Theories 
There are a number of theories in favour of diversity of board members to be found in the 
previous literature (Smith, Smith and Verner 2006).  Some of these theories related to 
women and men who own businesses, entrepreneurs while other theories related directly 
to women and men being managers, senior managers and directors and their differences 
and impacts in the board room and how are these differences can benefit the firms.    
In this chapter some of the main feminist theories will be covered briefly; the main 
concentration will be focused on the Resource Based theory as it is related directly to this 
investigation.      
3.1. Liberal Feminist Theory (LFT) 
LFT has its roots in liberal political philosophy (Fischer, Reuber, and Dyke, 1993) and 
Liberal Feminists seek change through appealing to the liberal values of equality, 
freedom and the right to choose (Lowe and Bentson, 1984). Behind the concept of 
Liberal Feminism lies the implicit assumption that women and men will be equal if they 
are given identical opportunities (Lowe and Bentson, 1984). LFT does not recognize any 
inherent gender differences. Rationality, viewed as the human essence, is assumed to be a 
purely mental capacity, and is considered to be separate from a person's gender. Disparity 
in achievements between genders is attributed to the differences in social opportunities 
presented to men versus women. Women, being deprived of access to various forms of 
education and experience, are argued to be less likely to realize their full potential 
(Fischer, Reuber and Dyke1993). 
Attempts at change are directed towards institutions and ideas that seem to keep women 
in disadvantaged positions such as sex-role socialization, inequality of opportunity, 
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unequal access to education, and female responsibility for child caring and housework 
(Lowe and Bentson, 1984). 
Anna McPhee, director of the EOWA (Equal Opportunity for women in the Workplace 
Agency), believes it’s largely cultural “Australia has been a leader in women’s rights but 
Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace has been on the agenda in Australia for 
just over 20 years” (Federal Parliament passed the Equal Opportunity for Women in the 
Workplace Act in 1986). “In the US it’s been on the agenda for more like 40 years,” 
explains McPhee, “so we have some catching up to do” (McPhee 2006, p.2).      
Johnsen and McMahon (2005), based on applying Liberal Feminist Theory, argued that 
female entrepreneurs would be less likely to state positive growth intentions than male 
entrepreneurs because they have fewer resources available for, and attach less value to, 
business expansion.  
Self-employment enables women to overcome discrimination and other employment 
difficulties (Cromie and Hayes, 1988). Consistent with LFT, however, several writers 
argue that self-employed women are still disadvantaged relative to self-employed men 
because women face barriers associated with education, families and workplaces 
(Kalleberg and Leicht, 1991).  
Understanding the factors that influence business performance lies at the heart of much 
work on management and organizations. Studies comparing the performance of male- 
and female-owned firms consistently show that businesses headed by women tend to be 
smaller than those headed by men, whether size is measured by gross revenues, number 
of employees, or profit level (Fischer, 1993; Fischer and Kalleberg, 1991). 
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Smaller businesses are more exposed to liabilities, such as difficulties in raising capital, 
meeting government regulations, and competing for labour with larger organisations that 
pay more and offer greater benefits (Johnsen and McMahon, 2005; Kalleberg and Leicht, 
1991). In this light, if businesses led by women are found to be smaller than those led by 
men, one might expect to find apparent gender-based differences in financial 
performance and business growth.   
There is also some evidence that female owned businesses grow less quickly than those 
owned by men (Cliff, 1998). Since size and growth are typically used as criteria for 
evaluating organizational success in terms of financial performance and business growth 
(Venkatraman and Ramanujam 1986), previous studies comparing male- and female-
owned firms have been directed primarily at providing explanations that can account for 
the “poorer performance” of businesses headed by women. 
Liberal Feminist Theory posits that if women had equal access to the opportunities 
available to men—such as education, work experience, and other resources—they would 
behave similarly (Cliff, 1998; Unger and Crawford 1992). Although no significant gender 
differences have been reported in the educational backgrounds of entrepreneurs (Birley, 
1992; Fischer, 1993), female entrepreneurs tend to have less industry, management, and 
prior business start-up experience (Carter, Williams, and Reynolds 1995, Fischer; Hisrich 
and Brush 1983; Kalleberg and  Leicht 1991,Watkins and Watkins 1983). Women who 
lack relevant experience may question their ability to manage a quickly growing 
enterprise and may therefore purposely limit the expansion of their firms. Lee-Gosselin 
and Grisé (1990 p. 431), for example, suggested that the minimal prior business 
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experience of the female entrepreneurs they interviewed contributed to their modest 
growth expectations. 
In addition to differences in their prior business experience, male and female 
entrepreneurs tend to face very different domestic demands. Despite the fact that women 
are entering the workforce and starting new businesses at an increasing rate, they are still 
more likely to be the “primary parent, emotional nurturer, and housekeeper” (Unger and 
Crawford 1992, p. 474). Unlike their male counterparts, female entrepreneurs are not 
usually relieved of their domestic responsibilities when they start a business (Belcourt 
1991, Goffee and Scase 1985) and are thus more likely to face conflicting demands 
between their professional and personal lives (Allen and Truman 1992; Buttner 1997; 
Goffee and Scase 1985; Stevenson 1990 and Stoner, Hartman and Arora 1990). This 
conflict may be manifested in the adoption of reduced growth intentions. 
3.2.   Social Feminist Theory   
The Social Feminist Theory posits that the differences between male and female 
experiences, which are argued to begin from the earliest moments of life, are likely to 
result in fundamentally different ways of viewing the world (Fischer, Reuber, and 
Dyke1993). These differences are one of the first things children learn, and it serves to 
both model and structure so much of their further learning (Douglas and Frey 2005). 
Children, from very young ages, act in traditional 'gender-appropriate' roles: girls playing 
with dolls and boys playing with trucks so that it often looks as though this is some sort 
of sex role genetic program that compels a little boy to reach for a gun or a truck rather 
than a doll or a toy dish. 
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Hannah (1986) argued that males and females were artificially differentiated from birth 
onwards by a series of pressures from family, school, church, workplace and other 
agencies of socialisation. These theories of gender socialisation suggested that while boys 
were being taught to be rational, logical and objective and to repress their feelings, the 
girls were learning to cultivate their emotions: to be directed towards the care of others 
and to ignore their facility to reason. Boys were being prepared for life-long occupations 
in the public domain - girls for immersion in the unpaid labour of domestic service, 
where child-bearing and child-rearing would constitute their only true vocation. 
Social feminism also offers a compelling argument for anticipating gender differences in 
growth intentions. This theoretical perspective asserts that women have different—yet 
equally valuable and effective—qualities, values, and ways of thinking due to variations 
in early and ongoing socialization processes (Black 1989). Men are expected to possess 
high levels of a genetic qualities such as self-assertion, self-expansion, and the urge to 
master, whereas women are expected to possess high levels of communal qualities such 
as selflessness, a concern for others, and interpersonal sensitivity (Eagly and Wood 
1991). 
The differences between male and female experiences are likely to result in 
fundamentally different ways of viewing the world (Fischer et al., 1993). Chodorow 
(1978) argues that mothers, by creating dissimilar relationships with sons and daughters, 
affect the socialization process and influence the way males and females view and 
interpret their surroundings. As a result of the differing socialization processes, SFT 
argues that women are placed at a disadvantage compared to males when it comes to 
starting and running their own business (Jones and Tullous, 2002).  
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These feminist theories provide useful background and input into considerations of 
gender and company performance. But they focus on disadvantages and rationales for 
lesser performance by women managers. They do not provide a mechanism to explain 
better performance by female dominated companies; why companies with more women 
on their boards might perform better in financial terms. The Resource Based Theory of 
the competitive advantage will be drawn on as the basis for this investigation. Basically, 
according to Barney (1997), resource-based theory argues that it is not industry structure 
that leads to competitive advantage and better performance. Rather, it is the ability to 
capitalize on and apply the firm's internal resources in uncertain and dynamic industry 
contexts. The RBT will frame a rationale for expecting higher performance by companies 
with boards with more women.  
3.3. The Resource Based Theory 
The fundamental principle of the RBT is that the basis for a competitive advantage of a 
firm lies primarily in the application of the bundle of valuable resources at the firm’s 
disposal (Wernerfelt, 1984 and Rumelt, 1984).  
The key points of the theory are: 
1. Identify the firm’s potential key resources.  
2. Evaluate whether these resources fulfill the following criteria:  
 Valuable - A resource must enable a firm to employ a value-creating strategy, by 
either outperforming its competitors or reduce its own weaknesses (Barney, 1991; 
Amit and Shoemaker, 1993). 
 Rare - To be of value, a resource must be by definition rare. In a perfectly 
competitive strategic factor market for a resource, the price of the resource will be 
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a reflection of the expected discounted future above-average returns (Barney, 
1986a; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991).  
 In-imitable - If a valuable resource is controlled by only one firm it could be a 
source of a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). This advantage could be 
sustainable if competitors are not able to duplicate this strategic asset perfectly 
(Peteraf, 1993; Barney, 1986b). 
 Non-substitutable - Even if a resource is rare, potentially value-creating and 
imperfectly imitable, an equally important aspect is lack of substitutability 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991). If competitors are able to counter the 
firm’s value-creating strategy with a substitute, prices are driven down to the 
point that the price equals the discounted future rents (Barney, 1986a; Conner, 
1991), resulting in zero economic profits.  
3. Care for and protect resources that possess these evaluations because doing so can 
improve organizational performance (Crook, Ketchen, Combs, and Todd, 2008).  
The Resource based theory explains a firm’s ability to reach sustainable competitive 
advantage when different resources are employed and these resources cannot be imitated 
by competitors which ultimately creates a competitive barrier (Mahoney and Pandian 
1992). RBT explains that a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage is reached by virtue 
of unique resources which these resources have the characteristics of being rare, valuable, 
inimitable, non-tradable, non-substitutable as well as firm specific (Barney 1999 cited by 
Finney et al.2004). These authors write about the fact that a firm may reach a sustainable 
competitive advantage through unique resources which it holds, and these resources 
cannot be easily bought, transferred, copied and simultaneously they add value to a firm 
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while being rare. It also highlights the fact that all resources of a firm may not contribute 
to a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage. Varying performance between firms is a 
result of heterogeneity of assets and RBT is focused on the factors that cause these 
differences to prevail (Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; Barney, 
2001). 
Firms can develop strong competitive advantages by accumulating unique or difficult to 
duplicate bundles of resources, and these resources can allow firms to take advantage of 
environmental opportunities or counterbalance threats. Supportive of the theory, research 
by Robins and Wiersema (1995) indicated that the ability to build these advantages paid 
off in terms of return on investment.  
Barney (1997) goes on to describe that human capital resources are key to competitive 
advantage. Employee and management capabilities are firm-level resources that are 
among the most sustainable and difficult for competitors to imitate. The notion of human 
resources being the key to competitive advantage is prominent in the current popular 
management literature. For example, writing of their collective experience with numerous 
company change efforts, Katzenbach et al. (1995) concluded that many firms have 
underutilized human resources in this modern era of international competition and 
organization change. The underutilized resources tend to include females and those of 
diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds who might otherwise bring different perspectives 
to the firm. By better utilizing the contributions of women and minorities, firms can 
become more creative and accepting of change. 
A study by Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997) explores relationships of women in 
management positions with firm financial performance utilizing the resource-based 
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theory of competitive advantage and found a positive relationship between women on 
board and firm’s financial performance. 
Blackburn et al. (1994) and Rosener (1995) argue that firms with large percentages of 
women in management are taking better advantage of the total pool of managerial 
resources and will be more likely to perform well financially.  
Rosener (1995) puts forth the argument that firms must seriously consider human 
resource management to be the major determinant of global competitiveness, and that 
firms fully utilizing the diverse talents of women managers stand to gain competitive 
advantages over those that do not. 
Shrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997) argue that firms employing a greater percentage of 
women managers have, according to the Resource-Based theory, been successful at 
acquiring a significant bundle of difficult to obtain resources. Empirical evidence 
supports this line of reasoning by showing that women make at least as good, if not 
better, managers than men (Rizzo and Mendez, 1988; Schwartz, 1989; Powell, 1990; 
Flynn, 1994). There is also some evidence that firms employing more women managers 
actually perform better financially (Blackburn et al., 1994; Throup, 1994) and that firms 
with heterogeneous management teams are better able to facilitate strategic change 
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).  
The Resource-Based Theory provides a solid backdrop for this investigation. Because 
women leaders and women on boards comprise a growing, and perhaps heretofore 
somewhat neglected resource for firms, it is now feasible as well as appropriate to test for 
women in leadership/boards and performance relationships.  
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There is evidence that women are more oriented toward supporting and maintaining 
relationships than men (Hisrich and Brush, 1994; Rosener, 1995). Women are also strong 
in the areas of idea generation and innovation, and are generally more satisfied with their 
jobs than men (Rosener, 1995). Therefore, as more and more women assume leadership, 
board and management positions, organizational learning, climate, and performance 
should improve.  
3.4. Summary  
In this chapter we covered some of the theories that researchers used over the year that 
deal with women on boards and financial performance. The Liberal Feminist theory 
values the equality, freedom and the right to choose (Lowe and Bentson, 1984).  Behind 
the concept of Liberal Feminism lies the implicit assumption that women and men will be 
equal if they are given identical opportunities (Lowe and Bentson, 1984). The Social 
Feminist theory argues that women and men are different. Hannah (1986) argued that 
males and females were artificially differentiated from birth onwards by a series of 
pressures from family, school, church, workplace and other agencies of socialisation. 
This theoretical perspective asserts that women have different—yet equally valuable and 
effective—qualities, values, and ways of thinking due to variations in early and ongoing 
socialization processes (Black 1989).  
The Resource based theory argues that firm resources include all assets, capabilities, 
organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc; controlled by a 
firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness. Rosener (1995) puts forth the argument that firms must 
seriously consider human resource to be the major determinant of global competitiveness, 
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and that firms fully utilizing the diverse talents of women managers and board members 
stand to gain competitive advantages over those that do not. Research by Hamel and 
Prahalad (1994) is based on the Resource based theory that the use and development of 
unique resources in relation to competitors is the key to competitive advantage. Firms 
that are expert at leveraging, or getting the most out of their set of unique resources, 
compete better in their industries, and human resources obviously play a major role in 
this process (Rizzo and Mendez, 1988; Schwartz, 1989; Powell, 1990; Flynn, 1994). The 
argument is that firms employing a greater percentage of women managers have, 
according to resource-based theory, been successful at acquiring a significant bundle of 
difficult to obtain resources. There is also some evidence that firms employing more 
women managers and women board members actually perform better financially 
(Blackburn et al., 1994; Throup, 1994) and that firms with heterogeneous management 
teams are better able to facilitate strategic change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Because 
women board members are very valuable members as previous studies showed and can 
bring new experiences and perspectives to the boardroom, new knowledge, 
communication skills, ethics, broaden boards discussions (detailed information can be 
found in table 2.1). Women board members have different skills set that might help 
improve risk management, audit control, learning climate, might generate extra effort 
from employees, and improve decision making and all the above might help improve 
firm’s financial performance. Skills like flexibility, women board members good at 
juggling and think strategically, women tend to be more nurturing, caring and sensitive 
than men, participative style, women are more transformational than men, and women are 
36 
 
strong in the areas of idea generation and innovation. The following chapter covers the 
hypotheses that were developed based on the RBT.             
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4. Chapter four: Research Method and Data.  
The primary research method is quantitative analysis and testing of the hypotheses. The 
purpose of this chapter is to describe the research method used to collect the financial 
data employed in this research and the analysis undertaken to test the hypotheses.  
An explanation of the reasons for choosing each of the accounting measures and details 
what each one represents. Details of the sources of the financial data are in section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 covers the development of the hypotheses. Finally the data analysis is 
outlined in section 4.4. 
4.1. Data Considerations 
To be able to establish relationship between gender of the board of directors and business 
financial performance it is very important to collect relevant data that will enable the 
hypotheses to be tested, statistically. In Pursuit of this main objective the first stage 
involved collecting the financial performance data of the Top 500 Australian listed 
companies for the years 2000-2007 inclusive. The main reason for choosing this period of 
years is because the Australian economy was consistently strong, with continued growth 
in all industries and stable economic and social conditions, throughout this period. The 
absence of any major economic shocks or changes over this period will potentially reduce 
any confounding effects of economic conditions.    
Accounting measures are the primary measures used to evaluate the financial 
performance of each company because they are the most commonly used to indicate the 
firm's earnings and returns to shareholders, and they convey a basic sense of the overall 
profitability of the firms. The financial performance measures that were chosen are Net 
Profit, Return on Equity, Increase in Capital and Business Market Value. Each of these 
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measures gives us different information about a company (McGuire, Sundgren and 
Schneeweis 1988). (See the discussion of these in section 4.2). 
Data were collected regarding the number and percentage of women on the board of 
directors for these companies over the same period of time.  
A statistical analysis was used to test the hypothesised relationships of the financial 
performance with the number of female directors on boards over the eight years.  
This analysis will look at the same data over the years 2000-2007 both overall and by 
type of industry. This analysis will reveal any industry differences in the financial 
performance with female directors’ relationship, and bring to light which industries have 
more female directors on boards.   
4.2. Data Collection Sources and Variables 
The data employed in this research are drawn from the Connect4, DatAnalysis and 
FinAnalysis databases. The Annual Report collection (Connect 4) provides access to the 
complete annual reports of Australian publicly listed companies. This Annual Reports 
collection is available via RMIT University. Annual reports not available from this 
source were accessed from the companies’ publicly available websites. 
Full corporate details of all listed Australian companies and ASX Top 1000 are drawn 
from DatAnalysis on RMIT Library site. It provides detailed corporate information on all 
companies currently listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, as well as over 1500 
delisted companies, including company annual reports, ASX company announcements 
from 1989 on, and listing prospectuses back to 1990. These reports are updated daily 
from relevant ASX announcements by Morningstar Research Pty Ltd. 
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FinAnalysis provides a 12 year history of detailed financial information for all companies 
listed on the ASX. These reports are updated daily by Morningstar Research Pty Ltd. 
FinAnalysis was used to run reports regarding the financial data of the ASX Top 1000. 
Data on Net Profit, Total increase in Capital, Business Market value and Total return on 
Equity for the years from 2000-2007 was collected.  
Annual reports are the main source of information on the number of directors on board as 
well as the number of female directors.  
The ASX web site was the source of Australian listed companies list. The list includes the 
full name of companies and their ASX code. The ASX code was used to find the 
company details in Connect4, especially annual reports. Sometimes not all the years were 
available and sometimes not all the reports were available; the unavailable data was then 
found in either Finanalysis or the company’s website.  
Data regarding the number of female directors on boards and the number of the total 
directors was drawn from the companies’ annual reports. 
The data was compiled into a flat data base with 368 Columns (Company name, ASX 
code, Industry, year, four performance variables, three gender measures, total board size, 
seven years dummy variables and 350 company dummy variables) and 2801 Rows 
(cases).  
Table 4.1 summarises the financial measures definitions, the reason for choosing them 
and where the measures can be found. 
 
 
Table 4-1 Financial Measures used.  
 
Variables  Code  Definition Reasons for Where can be 
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choosing found 
Net profit NPAT The final 
representation of 
how much money 
a company has 
earned from doing 
business over the 
course of a year. 
It represents the 
amount of 
earnings a 
company can 
achieve, a good 
indicator of a 
firm’s profitability 
On the company’s 
income statement 
or Annual Profit 
and Loss report or 
on financial 
performance 
statement. 
Annual Increase on 
total Equity 
ITE Measures how 
well a company 
uses reinvested 
earnings to 
generate 
additional 
earnings 
It gives a general 
indication of the 
company’s 
efficiency and the 
number of dollars 
of profits the 
company can earn 
for each dollar of 
shareholders' 
equity 
Can be found on 
balance sheets, or 
on Directors 
reports and some 
companies report 
it on their 
financial 
performance 
statements. 
Annual Increase on 
Capital 
CI Measures how 
well a company 
uses reinvested 
earnings to 
generate 
additional 
earnings. 
It indicates the 
number of dollars 
of profits the 
company can earn 
for each dollar of 
shareholders' 
equity. 
 
Can be found on 
balance sheets 
Business Market 
Value 
BMV  It represents the 
market value. 
Investors use 
market value to 
determine 
whether or not 
the market value 
is adequate or if 
it's undervalued in 
comparison to its 
book value. 
Can be found in 
directors reports 
and some 
companies report 
it on their 
financial 
performance 
statements. 
   
 
The list of the companies that was downloaded from ASX website started with 1000 
listed companies; however the final list with complete data was 350 listed companies, 
because some companies were not in business during some of the years or because of the 
unavailability of data.  
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The first performance variable that was chosen was Net Profit; the main reason for 
choosing Net Profit is because it represents the amount of earnings (after interest and tax) 
a company has achieved, it is a good indicator of a firm’s profitability. Net Profit (NPAT) 
is the final representation of how much money a company has earned from doing 
business over the course of a year. It takes all the money a company has received from 
operating and subtracts all expenses, including operating expenses, financing costs, and 
taxes. Net Profit is calculated as total revenue minus total expenses. Net Profit sometimes 
can be found on the company’s income statement or Annual Profit and Loss report or on 
the financial performance statement.  
The second financial measure that was chosen is Annual Increase in total Equity (ITE), 
because it measures how well a company uses reinvested earnings to generate additional 
earnings, giving a general indication of the company’s efficiency and the number of 
dollars of profits the company can earn for each dollar of shareholders' equity.  The way 
that it was calculated was (this year total equity – last year total equity) the difference 
between the two variables is the increase on total equity. Total Equity can be found on 
balance sheets, sometimes in directors reports (that are normally at the beginning of 
annual reports) and some companies report it on their financial performance statements. 
Business Market Value (BMV) is the third financial performance measure that was 
chosen. It represents the market value. The market value is often different from book 
value because the market takes into account future growth potential. Most investors who 
use fundamental analysis to pick stocks look at a company's market value and then 
determine whether or not the market value is adequate or if it's undervalued in 
comparison to its book value, net assets or some other measure. 
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The final financial measure is Annual Increase in Capital, because it represents how well 
the company invested in the amount of ownership and risk in a business. It was calculated 
as (Issued share capital this year – last year) the difference equals Annual Increase in 
Capital (IC). 
Table 4.1 summarises the financial measures definitions, the reason for choosing them 
and where the measures can be found. 
Some of the companies report half yearly and some report quarterly, which necessitated 
adding figures from various reports to get to the actual dollar amount for that year.     
To support the arguments for choosing the above financial measures; Table 4.2 lists some 
of the main prior studies in this area of interest that used the same financial measure, their 
reasons for using the measures and any relationship between female directors on boards 
and firm’s financial performance that was found. 
 
Table 4-2 Prior Studies: measures used.  
 
Name of the 
study 
Financial Measure and Reasons for 
choosing them  
Results and Findings  
Verboom and 
Ranzijn 2004  
Annual increase in capital was chosen 
as it measures the return on the value 
of the stockholder’s investment.   
The percentage of women on 
board related significantly with 
this measure. 
Verboom and 
Ranzijn 2004  
Net Profit Ratio was chosen because it 
is among the most commonly used to 
indicate the firm’s earnings and 
returns to shareholders, and they 
convey a basic sense of the overall 
profitability of the firms. 
Strong contribution of the 
percentage of female directors 
and firms’ financial performance. 
Verboom and 
Ranzijn 2004  
Increase in Total Equity was chosen as 
it measures the return on the value of 
the stockholder’s investment. 
The results indicate that the 
percentage of women on board 
variable contributed significantly 
to this measure. 
Catalyst 2004 
The Bottom 
Increase in Total Equity was chosen 
because it is good indicator of 
The group of companies with the 
highest representation on boards 
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Line stockholder investments.  had 35.1 percent higher Return 
on Equity. 
Véronique 
2004 
Increase in Total Equity.  IOE of 69 companies 
with women on boards averaged 
13.8% 
compared to 9.9% for 31 
companies with 
all male boards 
Catalyst  2005 Increase in Total Equity. It gives 
general an indication of the company’s 
efficiency.  
Found that companies with the 
highest 
representation of women on 
their senior 
management teams and board of 
directors had a 35% higher 
 
Erhardt, 
Werbel, and 
Shrader 
(2003) 
Increase in Total Equity Found that the percentage of 
Caucasian female directors on 
the board is positively related to 
return on equity for a 1998 
sample of 117 Fortune 1000 
firms. 
Smith, Smith, 
and Verner 
(2006) 
Gross profit/net sales. 
Contribution margin/net sales. 
Operating income/net assets. 
Net income after tax/net assets 
Found a positive relationship 
between the proportion of 
women on boards and financial 
Performance of companies. 
Dutta, Probal 
and Bose, 
Sudipta 2007  
Increase on Total Equity  Found small but positive 
relationship between women on 
board and this financial measure. 
Allen and 
Zehnder 2004  
Increase on Total Equity The highest number of female 
managers had 
a 35% better return 
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
 Women have been underutilized on board positions (Katzenbach et al., 1995; Rosener, 
1995). Because of this underutilization, firms are foregoing the opportunity to fully tap 
into their human resources. Thus, we argue that firms utilizing these human resources 
will perform well. Specifically, firms with large percentages of women on board are 
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taking better advantage of the total pool of professional resources and will be more likely 
to perform well financially (Blackburn et al., 1994; Rosener, 1995).  
All the above considerations lead to two forms of hypothetical relationships between 
women on boards and performance to be tested:  
Hypothesis 1: The number of women on a board is positively related with financial 
Performance of Australian listed companies.  
Hypothesis 2: The percentage of women on a board is positively related with financial 
performance of Australian listed companies.  
One woman board member, Rosener (1995) argues, is often dismissed as a token. Two 
females are not enough to be taken seriously. But three gives the board a critical mass 
and the benefit of the women’s' talents.  
Hypothesis 3: Having “at least three women” on the board of directors is related 
positively to financial performance. 
Any significant relationship between women on boards and financial performance 
(Hypotheses 1-3) will lead to investigating any industry differences in Australian listed 
companies in this relationship. 
 
4.4. Data Analysis   
Each performance measure is to be modelled as a function of Company, Year, and 
Gender variables. Ordinary Least Squares Multiple regression was used for the modelling 
(in the SPSS package). Using dummy variables for years and companies in this way 
enables the possible effects of the many other variables that impact on financial 
performance to be accounted for. For example company size, strategy and many other 
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factors influence performance, but these variables are company specific and are taken 
into account via the company dummy variable. Similarly, economic conditions vary, but 
these are accounted for via the year dummy variables. In this way, changes in economic 
conditions and the many company specific factors are controlled for in the analysis. 
Reflecting standard financial performance modelling practice, the dependent variable in 
the regressions was the natural logarithm of the particular financial measure. This 
practice here enables more ready comparisons with other studies and also has the 
technical advantage of reducing heteroscedasticity concerns. It also means that the impact 
of the explanatory variables is in percentage terms, rather than absolute values, which is a 
better interpretive basis and expectations fit with the theory discussed previously. 
The general model tested is; 
Ln(Yij) = α + Σ(i)βiCi + Σ(j)γjCj + δGij + εij 
Where CI = company I dummy variable (taking value 1 if i = I; value 0 otherwise) 
 AJ = year J dummy variable (taking value 1 if j = J; value 0 otherwise) 
 Gij = females on board measure for company i and year j 
 εij = random error 
 Y = in turn, NPAT, ICE, BMV and IC 
G = in turn, number of women on the board, percentage of women on the board, 
three+ women on the board (dummy variable = 1 if there are 3 or more 
women on the board; 0 otherwise) 
The C and A variables are controls; the interest in the analysis is in the G variables and 
testing the significance or not of the δ parameter. 
46 
 
5. Chapter five: Results 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the findings of the analyses and testing of the 
hypotheses. Section 5.1 is the preliminary findings of the research that were discovered 
from a simple analysis of the data before the regression tests of the hypotheses. Section 
5.2 covers the details of the hypotheses testing and final results. Section 5.3 is residuals 
analysis and diagnostics and finally section 6.4 summarises the results.        
  
5.1. The preliminary findings   
The total number of all directors on the boards over the research period years was 17,247 
and the number of female directors was 1,797 over the same period of time (directors 
with multiple directorships counted multiple times). Overall the percentage of female 
directors on boards is thus 10%. Some of the companies had three or more female 
directors (e.g. Blackmores Limited had three out of seven in 2007, Australian Ethical 
Investment Limited had four out of six in 2007 and Transurban Group had three out of 
eight in 2007). Some of the companies had three female directors at one time then 
reduced that number to one or none (e.g. Alinta Limited had three female directors in 
2003 and zero in 2007 and Redflex Holdings Limited had three female directors in 2002 
and only one in 2007). Only six companies had three female directors out of 350 listed 
companies in 2007. Only two companies had four female directors in 2007. The number 
of Australian companies that didn’t have any female directors on their boards in 2007 
was 130 out of the sample of 350. Comparing that number with the year 2000, the 
number of companies with no women directors in 2000 was 117 out of the sample of 350. 
That is, there was very little change over the eight year period, despite the prominent 
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debate over precisely this issue, both in the academic literature and the business press. 
The table below summarises the number of women on boards over this period  
Table 5-1 the number WOB in each year. 
 
Year 
No. Women on 
Board 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
0 127 122 134 156 155 153 140 130 
1 116 127 141 140 149 152 149 141 
2 30 29 33 40 37 40 38 39 
3 3 3 6 5 7 5 7 6 
4  1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Total  277 281 314 341 348 350 334 318 
 
The following table shows the industry breakdown list.  
Table 5-2 Industries 
 
Industry name Number of companies in each 
industry 
Automobile & Components 0 
Banks  7 
Capital Goods  16 
Classification Pending 3 
Commercial Services & Supplies 12 
Consumer Discretionary 0 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 5 
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Consumer Services 6 
Household & Personal Products 1 
Diversified Financials 24 
Enargy 4 
Financials 36 
Food & Staples Retailing 8 
Food Beverage & Tobacco 17 
GICS Sector Code Not Applicable 14 
Health Care Equipment & Services 5 
Insurance 92 
Material 14 
Media 17 
PharmaceuticalsBiotechnologyLifeSciences 26 
Real Estate 7 
Retailing 12 
Software&Services 3 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 5 
Telecommunication Services 12 
Transportation 4 
Utilities 0 
 350 
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5.2. The Hypotheses Tests and Results 
The hypotheses tests of the number and percentage of women on boards and the four 
financial performance measures (NPAT, ITE, BMV, and TIC) tested are covered in this 
section.  
In each of the repeated regressions, as expected, many company specific and year dummy 
variables were significant. These are not reported as their significance is fully expected 
and add little to knowledge. These variables were included as control variables to control 
for a myriad of effects, which they do. The important variables for consideration here are 
the gender ones. A typical example of the full regression results is shown in appendix 2.     
5.2.1. The Relationship between the Number of Women on Board 
and Net Profit After Tax (NPAT)  
The regression results for the number of women on board were not significant 
contribution to the variable Net Profit after Tax (NPAT).   
Table 5-3 the regression results for NPAT of the number WOB 
 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.880 0.855 0.79890 
Gender Variables  B T Sig 
women on Board   0.005 0.102 0.919 
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5.2.2. The Relationship between the Percentage of women on Board 
and Financial Performance Measure Net Profit after Tax 
(NPAT)  
The results indicate that the percentage of women on board variable and financial 
performance NPAT variable were not significant.      
Table 5-4 the regression results for NPAT of the percentage of WOB 
 
5.2.3. The Relationship between at Least Three Women on Board 
and Net Profit after Tax (NPAT)   
The regression results for the dependent variable NPAT for at least three women on 
board show a not significant result. This result can be expected because the number of 
companies that have 3+ women on boards is very limited, between 3-8 companies a year 
from 350 listed companies. The table below shows the main regression results for the 
dependent variable NPAT for at least three women on board.  
                  
Table 5-5 the regression results for NPAT for at least three WOB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.880 0.855 0.79876 
Gender Variables  B T Sig 
 women on Board   -0.003 -0.740 0.459 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.880 0.855 0.79864 
Gender Variables  B T Sig 
3+ women on Board   -0.227 -0.990 0.323 
51 
 
5.2.4. The Relationship between the Number of Women on Board 
and Financial Performance Measure Capital Increase 
 The number of women on boards has positive and significant contribution to the variable 
of Capital Increase over the whole sample.  
Table 5-6 the regression results for Capital Increase Number of WOB 
5.2.5. The Relationship between the Percentage of Women on Board 
and Financial Performance Measure Capital Increase 
The results indicate that the percentage of women on board variables contribution were 
positive and significant to the variable Capital Increase. 
Table 5-7 the regression results for Capital Increase the percentage of WOB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.6. The Relationship of at Least Three Women on Board and 
Financial Performance Measure Capital Increase  
The regression results for the dependent variable Capital Increase for at least three 
women on board is not significant. Below are the main regression results.  
R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.587 0.484 1.83705 
Gender Variables  B T Sig 
women on Board   0.476 3.449 0.001 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.586 0.488 1.85683 
Gender Variables  B T Sig 
3+ women on Board   0.027 2.919 0.004 
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Table 5-8 the regression results for Capital Increase for at least 3 WOB 
 
 
5.2.7. The Relationship between the Number of Women on Board 
and Financial Performance Measure Increase on total Equity 
ITE 
The regression report indicates that the number of women on board contribute 
positively and significant to the variable Increase in Total Equity (ITE). These results 
are important and significant because it provides strong support for hypothesis 1.  
Table 5-9 the regression results for Increase on total equity and the number of WOB. 
 
5.2.8. The Relationship between the Percentage of Women on Board 
and Financial Performance Measure Increase on total Equity 
ITE 
We were able to find a strong positive and significant relationship between the 
percentage of women on boards and financial performance measure increase on total 
equity.  
R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.584 0.486 1.86104 
Gender Variables  B T Sig 
3+ women on Board   0.846 1.354 0.176 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.737 0.675 1.26006 
Gender Variables  B T Sig 
3+ women on Board   0.233 2.716 0.007 
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Table 5-10 the regression results for Increase on total equity and the percentage of WOB. 
 
5.2.9. The Relationship of at Least Three Women on Board and 
Financial Performance Measure Increase of total Equity ITE   
The regression report indicates that the relationship between the variable of at least 
three women on board and financial performance variable increase in total equity 
(ITE) is not significant over all; this can be explained that the number of companies 
that have three or more women on board is very limited (8 Companies in 2007, 7 
companies in 2006, 6 companies 2005, 7 companies in 2004, 5 companies in 2003, 6 
companies in 2002, 3 companies in 2001, and 4 companies in 2000). The details of 
the regression results for ITE is in the table below. 
Table 5-11 the regression results for ITE for at least three WOB. 
 
 
 
 
R R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.736 0.674 1.26129 
Gender Variables  B T Sig 
3+ women on Board   0.013 2.104 0.036 
R R 
Squar
e 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.735 0.673 1.26329 
  B T Sig 
Gender Variables  
3+ women on Board   
0.448 1.206 0.228 
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5.2.10. The Relationship between the Number of Women on Board 
and Financial Performance Measure Business Market Value 
BMV 
The regression report indicates that the number of women on board contribute positively 
and significant to the variable of business market value (BMV). These results are very 
important and significant because it provides strong support for hypothesis 1: the number 
of women on a board is positively related with financial performance of Australian listed 
companies. 
Table 5-12 the regression results for BMV and the number of WOB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.11.  The Relationship between the Percentage of Women on 
Board and Financial Performance Measure Business Market 
Value BMV 
The regression report indicates that the percentage of women on board contribute 
positively and significant to the variable of business market value (BMV). These 
results are very important and significant because it provides strong support for 
hypothesis 2: the percentage of women on a board is positively related with the 
financial performance of Australian listed companies. 
R R 
Squar
e 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.855 0.831 0.94488 
  B T Sig 
Gender Variables  
women on Board   
0.287 4.840 0.000 
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Table 5-13 the regression results for BMV and the percentage of WOB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.12.  The Relationship of at Least Three Women on Board and 
Financial Performance Measure Business Market Value BMV  
The regression report indicates that the Relationship between the variable of at least 
three women on board and financial performance variable increase in business 
market value (BMV) is not significant over all; this can be explained that the number 
of companies that have three or more women on board is very limited (8 Companies 
in 2007, 7 companies in 2006, 6 companies 2005, 7 companies in 2004, 5 companies 
in 2003, 6 companies in 2002, 3 companies in 2001, and 4 companies in 2000). The 
details of the regression results for BMV are in the table below. 
Table 5-14 the regression results for BMV for at least three WOB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R R 
Squar
e 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.854 0.831 0.94654 
  B T Sig 
Gender Variables  
women on Board   
0.019 4.216 0.000 
R R 
Squar
e 
Adjuste
d R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
 0.923 0.828 0.95793 
  B T Sig 
Gender Variables  
women on Board   
-0.151 -0.457 0.648 
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5.3. Residuals analysis and diagnostics 
Multicollinearity is not a problem in the above models: all VIFs are less than 4, with the 
large majority near one. The residuals distributions (histograms) appear roughly Normal. 
With so many cases, some residuals greater than three in size can be expected, and are 
observed, but there are not too large a number, although there may be some indication 
that the residuals distribution is slightly heavier tailed than the Normal. There is no 
pattern to the large residuals and dropping the largest residuals from the analysis does not 
change the results in any meaningful way. 
We also tested for any industry differences but we couldn’t find any significant results. 
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5.4. Summary of the Results   
The Tables below summarise the key regression results 
Table 5-15 Summary of regression results: estimated coefficient (significance). 
 
Dependent Variable Number of Women 
on Board 
Percentage of 
Women on Board  
Three + Women on 
Board  
NPAT - 0.003 (0.459) 0.005 (0.919)  - 0.227 (0.323) 
Capital 0.027 (0.004)  0.476 (0.001)  0.806 (0.176)  
ITE 0.013 (0.036)  0.233 (0.007) 0.448 (0.228) 
BMV 0.287 (0.000) 0.019 (0.000)  -0.151 (0.648) 
  
Table 5-16 Summary of relationship hypothesized 
 
Relationship hypothesized Results 
1. The Relationship Between the 
Number of Women on Board and 
NPAT  
Not Significant  
2. The Relationship Between the 
Percentage of Women on Board and 
NPAT 
Not Significant 
3. The Relationship Between at Least 
Three Women on Board and NPAT 
Not Significant 
4. The Relationship Between the 
Number of Women on Board and CI 
Positive and Significant 
5. The Relationship Between the 
Percentage of Women on Board and 
CI 
Positive and Significant 
6. The Relationship Between at Least 
Three Women on Board and CI 
Not Significant 
7. The Relationship Between the 
Number of Women on Board and ITE 
Positive and Significant 
8. The Relationship Between the 
Percentage of Women on Board and 
ITE 
Positive and Significant 
9. The Relationship Between at Least 
Three Women on Board and ITE 
Not Significant 
10. The Relationship Between the Positive and Significant 
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Number of Women on Board and 
BMV 
11. The Relationship Between the 
Percentage of Women on Board and 
BMV 
Positive and Significant 
12. The Relationship Between at Least 
Three Women on Board and BMV 
Not Significant 
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6. Chapter six: Discussion and Conclusion  
6.1.  Hypotheses Results and Discussion  
This study investigated the relationship between gender at the board level and firm 
financial performance among several measures of women on board and financial 
performance. Based on the Resource Based Theory of competitive advantage we 
devolved hypotheses on this relationship between women on board and firm financial 
performance.  
The hypotheses tests and results indicated some mixed results among the relations of 
women on board measures and financial performance measures. It appeared that firms 
with a high number of women on the board and or a high percentage of women on the 
board have high financial performance, three of four of our financial performance 
measures indicated positive increasing contribution (CI, ITE and BMV) two of these 
three were strong and significant (ITE and BMV). However the financial performance 
(NPAT) didn’t show clear results. This may indicate that having a high number or 
percentage of women on board might have a positive and significant impact on long term 
financial performance measures rather than short term financial performance measures. 
This suggests that women board members are good planners and strong in the areas of 
idea generation and innovation. Women, some argue, are also transformational board 
members and they encourage participation in power and information and seek to enhance 
the status of employees (Bass, B. M., Avolio, B. J., and Atwater, L. 1996); this latter skill 
may encourage employees to raise their voice with ideas and innovations and make them 
feel responsible for improving company performance (table 2.2). All these areas will 
improve long term financial performance of companies. These results support the 
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Resource Based Theory of the competitive advantage that argues that firms can develop 
strong competitive advantages by accumulating unique or difficult to duplicate bundles of 
resources, Barney suggested that human capital resources are key to competitive 
advantage. Wiersema (1995) indicated that the ability to build these advantages paid off 
in terms of return on investment. This may suggest that firms that have utilised the 
resource of women will get a full benefit from the human resource skills firms can 
become more creative and accepting of change. Iles and Auluck (1993) found that diverse 
work forces were beneficial to firms because they facilitated team problem solving and 
synergy. The ability to manage diversity fostered the incorporation of various 
perspectives into organizational decision making, and firms that united a wider range of 
participants performed well   
In regard to the relationship between at least three women on board hypotheses and firms 
financial performance, the results were mostly not significant among all financial 
performance measures, the main reason for this result is likely to be that the number of 
companies that have three plus women on board were very limited in our sample - on 
average 3-8 companies per year (refer to table 6.1). We think it’s too early to test for 
three plus women on board, this doesn’t mean its invalid research question, however 
maybe future research will have better opportunity to find more companies with three 
plus women on board.    
The chart below compares the number of companies that have 3 plus women on board on 
each year to the number of companies that have no women on board (from table 6.1)  
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Figure 6-1 the number of companies that have 3 plus Women on the Board in each year compared to 
the number of companies that have no Women on the Board. 
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The chart indicates that the number of companies that have 3 plus women on their boards 
in our sample over the eight years was very low this may explain why this measure was 
not significant.  
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6.2. Industry level Results and Discussion 
The regression results at Industry level for the relationship between women on board for 
all the three dependent variables (the number of women on board, the percentage of 
women on board and at least three women on board) and all financial performances 
measures (NPAT, ITE, CI and BMV) were not significant because when the data table 
was sorted by Industry it appeared that the number and the percentage of women on 
board in each industry was very small (refer to Table 6.1).       
As a logical conclusion it’s too early to test for Industry differences because some of the 
industries have no women on boards at all and some have only few. For example in the 
industry Software & Services the number of companies that have no women on boards is 
100%. This is one of the main reasons that made it more appropriate for us to test the data 
for each individual company on its own over the eight years and compare the difference 
in financial performances when there are women on the board or no women on the board. 
The highest number of women on boards found is in the Insurance industry, the total 
number of women on boards (over the data period) is 65, but comparing that number with 
the total number of board members of 629 the difference is very big, and 90% of 
companies had no women on their board. The highest percentages of women on board in 
our sample were 17% industry Media the number of women on board is 19 of 110, 17% 
industry Retailing the number of women on board is 12 of 72, and 16% industry 
Pharmaceuticals Biotechnology Life Sciences the number of women on board is 19 of 
117.                 
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Table 6-1 the number and percentage of women on boards at the industry level and the percentage of 
companies with zero women on the board 
 
Industry The 
Number of 
Women on 
Boards by 
Industry 
The Number 
of Men on 
Board by 
Industry 
The 
Percentage 
of 
Companies 
with Zero 
Women on 
Boards by 
Industry % 
 Automobile & 
Components 
- - -  
Banks 5 35 87.5 
Capital Goods 9 94 91.26 
Classification Pending 3 26 89.65 
Commercial Services & 
Supplies 
4 58 93.54 
Consumer Discretionary -  - -  
Consumer Durables & 
Apparel 
2 28 93.33 
Consumer Services 4 44 91.66 
Household & Personal 
Products 
1 12 92.30 
Diversified Financials 21 138 86.79 
Energy  - - -  
Financials 23 196 89.49 
Food & Staples Retailing 2 39 95.12 
Food Beverage & 
Tobacco 
9 99 91.66 
GICS Sector Code Not 
Applicable 
10 88 89.79 
Health Care Equipment & 
Services 
3 28 90.32 
Insurance 65 564 89.66 
Material 9 94 91.26 
Media 19 91 82.72 
Pharmaceuticals 
Biotechnology Life 
Sciences 
19 98 83.76 
Real Estate 5 37 88.09 
Retailing 12 60 83.33 
Software & Services 0 12 100 
Technology Hardware & 
Equipment 
5 35 87.5 
Telecommunication 
Services 
9 84 90.32 
64 
 
Transportation 2 22 91.66 
Utilities - -  -  
Total  241 1982  
 
The following table represents the percentage of women on boards in each Industry 
examined.  
Table 6-2 the percentage of women on boards at each industry % of industry  
 
Industry  Percentage of 
women on 
boards % 
 Automobile & Components - 
Banks 13 % 
Capital Goods 9 % 
Classification Pending 10 % 
Commercial Services & Supplies 6 % 
Consumer Discretionary - 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 7 % 
Consumer Services 8 % 
Household & Personal Products 8 % 
Diversified Financials 13 % 
Energy - 
Financials 11 % 
Food & Staples Retailing 5 % 
Food Beverage & Tobacco 8 % 
GICS Sector Code Not Applicable 10 % 
Health Care Equipment & Services 10 % 
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Insurance 10 % 
Material 9 % 
Media 17 % 
Pharmaceuticals Biotechnology Life 
Sciences 
16 % 
Real Estate 12 % 
Retailing 17 % 
Software & Services 0 % 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 13 % 
Telecommunication Services 10 % 
Transportation 8 % 
Utilities - 
 
The following tabel represents the proportion of companies of each industry   
 
Table 6-3 the percentage of companies of each industry in the data sample.  
 
Industry  Percentage of 
women on 
boards % 
 Automobile & Components 0 % 
Banks 2 % 
Capital Goods 5 % 
Classification Pending 9 % 
Commercial Services & Supplies 3 % 
Consumer Discretionary 0 % 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 1 % 
Consumer Services 2 % 
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Household & Personal Products 3 % 
Diversified Financials 7 % 
Energy 1 % 
Financials 10 % 
Food & Staples Retailing 2 % 
Food Beverage & Tobacco 5 % 
GICS Sector Code Not Applicable 4 % 
Health Care Equipment & Services 1 % 
Insurance 26 % 
Material 4 % 
Media 5 % 
Pharmaceuticals Biotechnology Life 
Sciences 
7 % 
Real Estate 2 % 
Retailing 3 % 
Software & Services 1 % 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 1 % 
Telecommunication Services 3 % 
Transportation 1 % 
Utilities 0 % 
 
 
If we compare the two table 6.2 and 6.3 it does give us some very interesting results 
that potentially explain why all industry level regressions were not significant. The 
first table 6.2 represents the percentages of women on boards in all the industries 
examined, the second table 6.3 represents percentage of each industry over our 
sample, in another way it represents the importance of each industry in our sample. 
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This means the higher the percentage is, the higher the number of companies in our 
sample.  
Only the major industries in our sample will be compared from tables 6.2 with 6.3. 
These industries are Insurance which represents 26% of our Sample, Financials 
representing 10%, Pharmaceuticals Bio 7% and Classifications Pending 9% (refer to 
figure 6.2).      
 
Figure 6-2 Women on Board (WOB) representation by Industry  
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The Insurance industry has the highest number of companies in our sample it represents 
26% of our sample and yet the percentage of companies with no women on the board is 
90%. The financials industry represents 10% of our sample and the percentage of 
companies that have women on the board is 89%. The Pharmaceuticals Bio industry 
represents 7% of our sample and the percentage of companies that have no women on the 
board is 84%.  
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The low representation of women on board at the industry level makes it very hard and 
unlikely to find any significant relationship between women on boards and financial 
performance at this stage. Maybe future research that would examine industry 
relationships consider examining women at the senior level of management in addition 
to women on board hopefully that would give them the opportunity to find higher 
number and higher percentages of women.  
   
6.3. Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to evaluate the influence of gender at the board level 
on firm financial performance of Australian listed companies. In the theoretical part of 
the research, we argued that board diversity affects the financial performance of the 
firm. According to the existing research the influence can be positive as well as 
negative (Smith, Smith and Verner 2005).  
Women are poorly represented on Australian boards (Braund 2005). At the same time, 
gender diversity at board level is gaining recognition both as a risk management 
strategy and for improving company performance.  
This investigation linked the benefits of having gender diversity at the board level to 
few major points or values that are significant to all companies. Most of these values 
were investigated by researchers in the past as well. The main one was that having a 
gender mix at the board of directors is good for the bottom line, because having more 
women on corporate boards can have economic rewards and we listed a number of 
studies (Allen 2006, Lynch 2006, Spurgeon and Cross 2005) that were able to provide 
evidence that having more women on board helped improve financial performance of 
companies. For example Fortune 500 companies with the highest percentage of female 
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directors had 53% higher return on equity (ROE), 42% higher return on sales (ROS), 
and  62% higher return on invested capital (ROIC). We also investigated the reasons 
of why having more women on board might help improve the financial performance of 
companies and listed them in (Table 2.2). Another major value was that having a 
gender mixed boards is a wise corporate governance practice because it improves 
decision-making, greater attention to ethics and corporate social responsibility, and 
better representation of important business stakeholders are just some of the ways 
corporate governance practices can improve with more women on boards.   
Using a sample of 350 Australian listed companies over the period 2000-2007, we 
analysed whether the proportion of women on boards of directors affects firm 
financial performance. The conclusion is mixed and depends on the measure of 
performance and the measure of the proportion of women on boards. The effect of the 
proportion of women on boards on financial performance varies from no effect to 
positive and significant in some of the financial measures. For example financial 
measure BMV has positive and significant effect, CI has positive and significant effect 
as well as and ITE comparing to NPAT that had no effect at all.  These results might 
also indicate that women on board have positive and significant impact on long term 
investments rather than short term investments. This can go back to few reasons that 
we’ve list before, like having more women on board will improve corporate 
governance practices and that will improve firms’ performance over the long term. We 
also argued that diversity in the board room improves decision making based on the 
evaluation of more alternatives compare to one gender boards. It also improves risk 
management practises and planning and both can help improve long term financial 
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performance. It will also improve the image of the firm and in this way have positive 
effects on firms long term performance and shareholders values in the positive image 
has positive effects on customers’ behaviour. Adding to that our results indicate that 
the positive effect is related to the number of women on boards and the percentage of 
women on board hypotheses and the three plus women on board hypotheses has a 
smaller or not significant effect. Also examined the relationship between women on 
board and financial performance by industry but the results showed unclear effects 
because the proportion of women on board in each industry was very small to none. 
Therefore we believe it’s too early to test by industry and hopefully future research 
will be able to find a bigger proportion of women on board in all industries for the test 
to be effective and clear. 
As final thoughts improving the participation of women on boards with proactive 
diversity strategies and a commitment to objective selection criteria when seeking 
directors are required. Professional networks for women play an important part in 
working with companies to make board positions available and promote the many 
board-ready women into these roles. 
As mentioned before, increasing the variety of people who serve on boards offers the 
opportunity to tap into a rich pool of talented candidates, bringing new voices, 
experiences and approaches to the decision-making process. It will also help to add 
depth to existing skills and ideas and, perhaps most importantly, bring the board closer 
to properly representing its stakeholders.  
To benefit from the increasingly important assets that women bring to companies, 
corporate boards must not only recognize those assets, but also develop a plan to 
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ensure that their boards become more gender diverse. This plan should stem from a 
careful analysis of the current skills and experiences of board members, thus 
identifying any existing gaps. 
Boards should actively seek out potential women candidates who could address these 
gaps. This means expanding the scope and depth of the search for new directors. For 
example, board recruiters could approach women's business groups or solicit the 
recommendations of women executives, both within and outside the company. 
Contacting universities and business schools are other excellent ways to find out about 
potential directors talent. For example, most of the students enrolled in a MBA 
program have experience in management, or leadership or and have interest in boards.  
In addition to improved recruiting, effective diversity plans must include programs to 
assist women to succeed in their new responsibilities, such as mentoring, corporate 
orientation and in-depth briefings on core business and industry issues. These 
programs ultimately benefit all new board members. 
Overall, the board's diversity plan should be specific and measurable, with clear 
accountabilities. But, this is not about establishing quotas. Rather, an effective 
diversity initiative examines and evaluates results, not just numbers. 
Nevertheless, boards are solely responsible for the poor representation of women on 
corporate boards. Women must also actively seek out potential opportunities to serve 
at the board level. No one can sit back and expect board appointments to come their 
way. 
To attract board invitations, women must promote their accomplishments, build and 
leverage their connections, and seek opportunities to enhance their qualifications. And 
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when they join a board, they must be willing to invest their time and talent toward 
learning and contributing to a healthy discussion of the issues. Once more women take 
charge of their own future; the fruits of their efforts will blossom, grow and spread the 
seeds for future opportunities (Stephenson 2004).  
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7. Appendices 
7.1. Appendix  one – example of data collection   
  Year  ASX 
Code 
Full Name of 
the Company 
Indust
ry  
Code 
Financial 
Performan
ce  
2  
ITE 
Financial 
Performan
ce 4 
NPAT 
Financial 
Performa
nce 5 
Capital 
Num
ber 
of 
Fem
ale 
Dire 
ctors  
Num
ber 
of 
the 
Total 
Direc
tors 
The 
Perc
enta
ge of 
Fem
ale 
Direc
tors  
1 2007 AAC AUSTRALIAN 
AGRICULTURAL  
COMPANY LIMITED. 
L 143,229,000 3,645,000 18,670,000 0 6 0 
  2006       23,657,000 10,102,000 1,180,000 0 6 0 
  2005       142,897,000 16,779,000 73,390,000 0 6 0 
  2004       47,938,000 6,189,000 60,000 0 6 0 
  2003       114,209,000 18,276,000 8,996,000 1 6 0.06 
  2002       59,161,000 20,601,000 38,147,000 1 6 0.06 
  2001       133,724,000 0 8,488,000 1 6 0.06 
  2000       0 0 0 1 6 0.06 
2 2007 AAH ARANA 
THERAPEUTICS 
LIMITED 
S 223,301,000 133,414,000 89,699,000 1 8 0.08 
  2006       9,613,000 5,093,000 4,974,000 1 7 0.07 
  2005       10,309,000 25,711,000 -2,442,000 1 6 0.06 
  2004       31,916,000 28,341,000 3,572,000 1 5 0.05 
  2003       -5,855,000 -15,771,000 9,945,000 1 5 0.05 
  2002       -6,264,000 -8,925,000 2,741,000 1 5 0.05 
  2001       36,328,000 30,667,000 4,906,000 1 5 0.05 
  2000       -334,000 -314,000 11,000 1 5 0.05 
3 2007 AAX AUSENCO LIMITED C 24,965,000 41,502,000 609,000 0 10 0 
  2006       11,691,000 13,421,000 103,000 1 12 0.12 
  2005       14,252,000 5,663,000 20,709,000 0 10 0 
  2004       9,521,000 6,309,000 20,709,000 0 4 0 
  2003       4,131,000 1,058,000 20,709,000 1 4 0.04 
  2002         2,789,000   1 4 0.04 
  2001         1,508,000   1 4 0.04 
  2000         144,000   1 4 0.04 
4 2007 ABB ABB GRAIN 
LIMITED 
L 19,200,000 7,300,000 32,600,000 1 9 0.09 
  2006       71,662,000 66,700,000 29,158,000 1 9 0.09 
  2005       11,204,000 17,705,000 4,643,000 0 12 0 
  2004       665,264,000 17,141,000 674,235,00
0 
0 12 0 
  2003       19,125,000 15,038,000 7,352,000 0 10 0 
  2002       -9,653,000 14,423,000 -
11,128,000 
0 10 0 
  2001       0 12,800,000 0 0 10 0 
  2000       0 0 0 0 10 0 
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7.2. Appendix  Two– The full regression results for 
dependent variable ITE on the Percentage of Women 
on Boards. 
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. 
Error 
Beta Tolera
nce 
VIF 
 (Constant) 16.094 .522 
 
30.837 .000 
  
The 
Percentag
e of 
Female 
Directors  
.013 .006 .058 2.104 .036 .230 4.341 
AAC 1.510 .703 .042 2.147 .032 .461 2.169 
AAH .235 .771 .005 .304 .761 .536 1.864 
AAX -.689 .765 -.016 -.900 .368 .545 1.836 
AAB .757 .765 .018 .990 .322 .546 1.833 
ABC .676 .702 .019 .962 .336 .463 2.161 
ABP .845 .766 .020 1.103 .270 .544 1.839 
ABS 1.321 .730 .037 1.810 .071 .428 2.337 
AEO 1.494 .893 .027 1.673 .095 .666 1.502 
AEU .130 1.364 .001 .095 .924 .855 1.169 
AFG 1.917 .732 .049 2.620 .009 .497 2.012 
AGM -.960 .736 -.025 -1.303 .193 .491 2.039 
AGS -3.027 .728 -.078 -4.155 .000 .501 1.995 
AIX 1.320 .767 .031 1.722 .085 .543 1.843 
ALB -.062 1.032 -.001 -.060 .952 .748 1.337 
ALL 1.361 .766 .032 1.776 .076 .543 1.840 
ALS .441 .702 .012 .628 .530 .463 2.161 
ALZ 2.224 .682 .066 3.261 .001 .429 2.329 
AMC 2.153 .769 .050 2.800 .005 .539 1.854 
AMP 4.195 .820 .088 5.116 .000 .593 1.687 
ANN .490 1.367 .005 .358 .720 .852 1.174 
ANZ 4.186 .685 .124 6.109 .000 .425 2.352 
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AOE -.734 .729 -.019 -1.008 .314 .501 1.995 
APA 1.737 .764 .041 2.272 .023 .546 1.832 
API 1.436 .816 .030 1.760 .079 .598 1.671 
APN 2.102 .731 .054 2.876 .004 .498 2.009 
AQP 1.159 .685 .034 1.693 .091 .426 2.347 
ARP -1.029 .682 -.030 -1.508 .132 .430 2.328 
ARQ .098 .705 .003 .138 .890 .459 2.180 
ASB .490 .702 .014 .697 .486 .463 2.161 
ASX .844 .709 .023 1.191 .234 .454 2.203 
AUN .062 .817 .001 .076 .939 .598 1.673 
AWB 1.257 .729 .032 1.723 .085 .500 2.000 
AWC 2.270 .765 .053 2.969 .003 .546 1.832 
AWE .549 .681 .016 .806 .420 .430 2.325 
BEC 2.268 .893 .041 2.540 .011 .666 1.501 
BBC .305 .767 .007 .398 .691 .543 1.843 
BBG 1.363 .707 .038 1.929 .054 .457 2.189 
BBI 1.420 .728 .036 1.949 .051 .501 1.995 
BEC 1.513 .692 .045 2.185 .029 .417 2.401 
BHP 5.235 .731 .134 7.157 .000 .497 2.012 
BKN 2.035 .687 .060 2.964 .003 .423 2.362 
BLD 2.083 .687 .062 3.032 .002 .423 2.362 
BMN 2.707 1.046 .040 2.588 .010 .728 1.374 
BNB .171 .818 .004 .209 .835 .595 1.680 
BOL 1.357 .709 .038 1.914 .056 .454 2.205 
BOQ .550 .688 .016 .800 .424 .422 2.368 
BPT 3.117 .819 .065 3.807 .000 .595 1.682 
BSL -2.886 .738 -.074 -3.909 .000 .488 2.049 
BTA 1.284 .681 .038 1.884 .060 .430 2.325 
BWP 2.498 .774 .058 3.227 .001 .532 1.879 
BXB -.261 .681 -.008 -.383 .702 .430 2.325 
CAB 5.015 .703 .139 7.136 .000 .462 2.165 
CBA -1.125 .711 -.031 -1.583 .114 .451 2.215 
CBH 2.005 .817 .042 2.453 .014 .597 1.676 
CCL -1.269 .707 -.035 -1.793 .073 .456 2.194 
CCP .646 .728 .017 .887 .375 .501 1.995 
CDR -2.163 .732 -.055 -2.955 .003 .496 2.014 
CER 1.414 .703 .039 2.013 .044 .462 2.164 
CEY 2.838 .685 .084 4.147 .000 .426 2.346 
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CFX 2.281 1.034 .034 2.206 .028 .745 1.343 
CGF .413 .729 .011 .567 .571 .501 1.997 
CIY 2.876 .704 .080 4.086 .000 .460 2.172 
CMJ -1.370 .702 -.038 -1.951 .051 .463 2.161 
CMR 2.159 .728 .055 2.964 .003 .501 1.995 
CNP -1.013 .702 -.028 -1.443 .149 .463 2.159 
COF .466 .681 .014 .684 .494 .430 2.325 
COH 2.355 .729 .060 3.229 .001 .500 2.000 
CPA 1.711 .703 .047 2.434 .015 .462 2.165 
CPU .921 .764 .022 1.205 .228 .546 1.830 
CRG 1.606 .703 .044 2.286 .022 .462 2.165 
CSL 2.116 .768 .050 2.754 .006 .541 1.850 
CSR -.275 .733 -.007 -.375 .708 .495 2.021 
CTO 2.878 .728 .074 3.950 .000 .501 1.995 
CUS 2.831 .741 .073 3.822 .000 .485 2.064 
CXC .071 .705 .002 .101 .919 .459 2.177 
CXP .590 .765 .014 .772 .440 .546 1.832 
DJS 1.374 .696 .041 1.974 .049 .412 2.428 
DOW 2.622 .765 .061 3.429 .001 .546 1.832 
DXS -.706 .819 -.015 -.862 .389 .594 1.685 
EHL 1.295 .771 .030 1.679 .093 .536 1.865 
ENE 1.355 .815 .028 1.664 .096 .601 1.665 
ENV -.074 .702 -.002 -.105 .916 .463 2.161 
EQI -.078 .764 -.002 -.103 .918 .546 1.831 
EQN -.807 .764 -.019 -1.057 .291 .547 1.829 
ERA 1.754 .702 .049 2.498 .013 .463 2.161 
FCL 2.913 .732 .075 3.980 .000 .496 2.014 
FGL .746 .689 .022 1.083 .279 .421 2.376 
FLT 1.295 .702 .036 1.845 .065 .463 2.159 
FLX .585 .729 .015 .803 .422 .501 1.997 
FMG -1.056 .681 -.031 -1.550 .121 .430 2.325 
FWD -.690 .686 -.020 -1.006 .315 .425 2.354 
FXJ 2.679 .708 .074 3.784 .000 .455 2.196 
GBG -.885 .764 -.021 -1.159 .247 .546 1.831 
GCL -.500 .764 -.012 -.655 .513 .546 1.831 
GNS 1.444 .683 .043 2.115 .035 .428 2.335 
GPT 3.219 .689 .095 4.671 .000 .421 2.378 
GRD .650 .740 .017 .878 .380 .486 2.058 
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GTP .917 .712 .025 1.287 .198 .450 2.223 
GUD -.924 .764 -.022 -1.209 .227 .546 1.831 
GWT -.342 .815 -.007 -.420 .674 .601 1.665 
HIL .297 .686 .009 .433 .665 .424 2.360 
HSP .797 .681 .024 1.170 .242 .430 2.325 
HVN 2.192 .684 .065 3.203 .001 .426 2.346 
HWI -.144 .729 -.004 -.198 .843 .501 1.997 
IAG 3.104 .777 .073 3.996 .000 .529 1.892 
IBA -1.211 .731 -.031 -1.656 .098 .497 2.010 
IDL -1.573 .829 -.033 -1.898 .058 .580 1.723 
IFL -.659 .905 -.012 -.728 .467 .649 1.541 
IGO -.232 .826 -.005 -.281 .779 .584 1.713 
IIF 2.274 .687 .067 3.310 .001 .423 2.365 
ILU .704 .732 .018 .963 .336 .497 2.012 
IOF 2.300 .702 .064 3.275 .001 .462 2.162 
IPL 1.053 1.041 .016 1.012 .312 .735 1.360 
IRE -1.123 .692 -.033 -1.622 .105 .417 2.399 
IVC -.181 .821 -.004 -.220 .826 .592 1.690 
JBH -.252 .815 -.005 -.310 .757 .600 1.666 
JHX 1.644 .815 .034 2.016 .044 .599 1.668 
JML -.913 .730 -.023 -1.251 .211 .500 2.001 
JST -.059 .915 -.001 -.064 .949 .634 1.577 
KCN 2.606E-
12 
.728 .000 .000 1.00
0 
.502 1.994 
KZL -.545 .716 -.015 -.762 .446 .445 2.245 
LEI 1.688 .702 .047 2.404 .016 .463 2.161 
LGL 3.349 .895 .061 3.740 .000 .663 1.509 
LLC 2.842 .815 .060 3.489 .000 .601 1.665 
LNN 1.348 .735 .035 1.835 .067 .493 2.029 
LYC -.828 .764 -.019 -1.083 .279 .546 1.831 
MAH -.020 .773 .000 -.025 .980 .534 1.873 
MAP 4.375 .764 .102 5.724 .000 .546 1.831 
MCC .654 .702 .018 .931 .352 .463 2.160 
MCG 3.507 1.033 .052 3.394 .001 .746 1.341 
MCR -.820 .681 -.024 -1.203 .229 .430 2.325 
MCW 2.347 .683 .069 3.434 .001 .428 2.338 
MDL .346 .815 .007 .424 .672 .600 1.668 
MDT 2.614 1.033 .039 2.532 .011 .747 1.339 
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MFS .572 .729 .015 .785 .433 .501 1.997 
MGR 2.542 .685 .075 3.710 .000 .426 2.350 
MGX -.555 .764 -.013 -.726 .468 .546 1.831 
MIG 3.953 .702 .109 5.630 .000 .463 2.161 
MIS -1.149 .736 -.029 -1.561 .119 .491 2.037 
MLB -1.387 .704 -.038 -1.969 .049 .460 2.175 
MLE .474 .707 .013 .670 .503 .456 2.193 
MLI -1.215 .820 -.025 -1.481 .139 .592 1.689 
MND -1.278 .685 -.038 -1.865 .062 .425 2.351 
MOF 2.745 .681 .081 4.028 .000 .430 2.326 
MQG 3.354 .689 .099 4.868 .000 .421 2.376 
MRE 3.050 .898 .055 3.395 .001 .658 1.519 
MTS 1.587 .767 .037 2.070 .039 .543 1.843 
MYO -.066 .702 -.002 -.094 .925 .463 2.161 
NAB 5.110 .732 .131 6.982 .000 .497 2.014 
NCM 2.142 .735 .055 2.915 .004 .493 2.029 
NEM 3.473 .764 .081 4.544 .000 .546 1.831 
NUF 1.379 .706 .038 1.955 .051 .458 2.184 
NWS 6.030 .825 .126 7.312 .000 .586 1.706 
NXS -.617 .825 -.013 -.748 .455 .586 1.707 
OGC .753 .901 .014 .836 .403 .655 1.527 
OKN -1.490 .702 -.041 -2.122 .034 .462 2.162 
ORG 3.118 .734 .080 4.247 .000 .494 2.026 
ORI 1.587 .734 .041 2.162 .031 .494 2.024 
OSH 2.517 .734 .065 3.429 .001 .494 2.026 
OST 1.763 .687 .052 2.566 .010 .423 2.364 
OXR 1.771 .681 .052 2.599 .009 .430 2.325 
PBG .035 .825 .001 .042 .966 .586 1.706 
PDN -.207 .729 -.005 -.284 .776 .501 1.997 
PEM -.803 .682 -.024 -1.177 .239 .430 2.328 
PGL -.787 .769 -.018 -1.023 .306 .540 1.852 
PLA -1.838 .765 -.043 -2.402 .016 .545 1.834 
PMP .295 .734 .008 .402 .688 .494 2.023 
PNA -.817 .779 -.019 -1.049 .295 .525 1.904 
PPT .312 .721 .009 .433 .665 .439 2.276 
PPX 1.758 .742 .045 2.369 .018 .483 2.071 
PRG -.396 .682 -.012 -.581 .561 .430 2.326 
PSA .648 .893 .012 .726 .468 .667 1.500 
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PXS -.234 1.040 -.003 -.225 .822 .736 1.359 
QAN 3.360 .733 .086 4.584 .000 .495 2.020 
QBE 3.717 .686 .110 5.419 .000 .425 2.355 
QGC -.541 .702 -.015 -.771 .441 .463 2.161 
RAT 2.167 1.032 .032 2.101 .036 .748 1.336 
RDF -.719 .746 -.018 -.964 .335 .478 2.093 
RHC .795 .712 .022 1.116 .265 .450 2.222 
RIC .029 .707 .001 .041 .967 .457 2.191 
RIO 4.591 .706 .127 6.503 .000 .458 2.185 
RIV .010 .893 .000 .011 .991 .666 1.501 
RMD 1.865 .681 .055 2.737 .006 .430 2.325 
ROC .945 .815 .020 1.159 .247 .600 1.668 
RRT .310 .770 .007 .403 .687 .539 1.856 
RSG .923 .815 .019 1.132 .258 .600 1.666 
SAI -.288 .896 -.005 -.322 .748 .662 1.512 
SBM -.419 .764 -.010 -.549 .583 .546 1.832 
SDG .605 .712 .017 .850 .395 .450 2.221 
SDL -.320 1.038 -.005 -.308 .758 .739 1.353 
SEK .210 .893 .004 .236 .814 .666 1.501 
SEV 2.271 .776 .053 2.928 .003 .530 1.887 
SFH 1.493 .815 .031 1.832 .067 .600 1.667 
SGB 2.217 .743 .057 2.982 .003 .481 2.078 
SGM 1.527 .681 .045 2.241 .025 .430 2.325 
SGN .543 .707 .015 .769 .442 .457 2.189 
SGP 3.630 .685 .107 5.302 .000 .426 2.348 
SGT 4.793 .769 .112 6.234 .000 .540 1.852 
SGX .536 .815 .011 .658 .511 .601 1.665 
SHL 1.916 .707 .053 2.711 .007 .457 2.189 
SIP .427 .768 .010 .557 .578 .541 1.848 
SKE -.571 .685 -.017 -.834 .404 .426 2.349 
SLM -.549 .764 -.013 -.718 .473 .546 1.831 
SLV -1.868 .829 -.039 -2.253 .024 .580 1.724 
SLX -.389 .902 -.007 -.432 .666 .654 1.530 
SMX -.523 .782 -.012 -.668 .504 .521 1.919 
SMY .097 .815 .002 .119 .905 .600 1.666 
SPT .445 .740 .011 .601 .548 .486 2.056 
SRL 1.015 .704 .028 1.443 .149 .460 2.172 
STO 3.073 .729 .079 4.216 .000 .501 1.998 
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SUL -.192 .815 -.004 -.235 .814 .600 1.666 
SUN 3.593 .705 .099 5.095 .000 .459 2.180 
TAH 1.677 .686 .050 2.444 .015 .424 2.359 
TAP .315 .736 .008 .428 .668 .491 2.036 
TCL 3.983 .922 .072 4.322 .000 .625 1.599 
TEL 2.473 .778 .058 3.179 .002 .527 1.897 
TEN .380 .897 .007 .424 .672 .661 1.514 
TIM 1.092 .703 .030 1.553 .121 .462 2.165 
TLS 4.497 .821 .094 5.474 .000 .591 1.693 
TOL 2.641 .708 .073 3.731 .000 .455 2.196 
TRS -2.300 .829 -.048 -2.775 .006 .580 1.723 
TSE 1.093 .706 .030 1.549 .122 .458 2.183 
TWR .688 .826 .014 .832 .405 .584 1.713 
UGL .810 .683 .024 1.186 .236 .428 2.335 
UXC .244 .738 .006 .331 .741 .488 2.050 
VCR -1.369 .799 -.032 -1.713 .087 .499 2.003 
VPG 1.352 .815 .028 1.659 .097 .600 1.666 
WAN -.163 .765 -.004 -.213 .831 .546 1.832 
WBC 3.970 .718 .110 5.529 .000 .442 2.260 
WDC 5.095 .816 .107 6.242 .000 .598 1.671 
WES 2.624 .737 .067 3.561 .000 .490 2.041 
WOR 1.481 .733 .038 2.021 .043 .495 2.018 
WOW 2.053 .710 .057 2.891 .004 .452 2.211 
WPL 3.086 .709 .085 4.350 .000 .453 2.206 
WSA -1.033 .731 -.029 -1.413 .158 .427 2.340 
WYL -.837 1.031 -.012 -.811 .417 .749 1.335 
ZFX 2.707 .899 .049 3.012 .003 .658 1.520 
SHG -.694 .818 -.015 -.848 .396 .595 1.680 
TGR -.734 .831 -.015 -.883 .377 .577 1.734 
AAM -1.928 .815 -.040 -2.366 .018 .600 1.666 
ALR -.795 .764 -.019 -1.041 .298 .546 1.831 
AII 2.225 .818 .047 2.718 .007 .595 1.680 
ACS -1.688 1.032 -.025 -1.636 .102 .748 1.336 
AEX -1.677 .893 -.030 -1.879 .060 .667 1.500 
ACR -.090 1.368 -.001 -.065 .948 .851 1.175 
ADA -1.484 .822 -.031 -1.806 .071 .591 1.693 
ADU -.742 .815 -.016 -.910 .363 .600 1.666 
AAU -1.376 .729 -.035 -1.888 .059 .501 1.997 
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ADB .511 .686 .015 .745 .457 .425 2.355 
ADY -2.033 .764 -.048 -2.661 .008 .546 1.831 
ADG -1.269 .702 -.035 -1.808 .071 .463 2.159 
ASC -.444 .893 -.008 -.498 .619 .667 1.500 
ANM 1.290 .815 .027 1.582 .114 .600 1.666 
AGX -1.851 1.043 -.027 -1.775 .076 .732 1.367 
AHC -2.574 .768 -.060 -3.350 .001 .541 1.850 
AIZ 2.112 .733 .054 2.882 .004 .496 2.018 
AJL -.516 .729 -.013 -.707 .480 .500 2.000 
ALE -3.296 .909 -.060 -3.627 .000 .643 1.555 
ALK -2.011 .771 -.047 -2.609 .009 .537 1.862 
AHD -.406 .708 -.011 -.574 .566 .455 2.196 
ABI -1.906 .898 -.035 -2.122 .034 .658 1.519 
AMH -.061 .764 -.001 -.080 .936 .546 1.831 
AAR -2.586 .815 -.054 -3.175 .002 .601 1.665 
APE -.256 .692 -.008 -.370 .711 .417 2.399 
AXM -1.817 1.040 -.027 -1.748 .081 .736 1.358 
ARG 2.516 .691 .074 3.644 .000 .419 2.388 
ARE -2.340 .823 -.049 -2.844 .005 .589 1.698 
ARA -1.130 .705 -.031 -1.603 .109 .459 2.178 
ARO -2.837 .815 -.059 -3.482 .001 .600 1.666 
ATP -2.592 .764 -.061 -3.392 .001 .546 1.831 
AIA 1.754 .682 .052 2.573 .010 .430 2.326 
AET -3.049 .767 -.071 -3.977 .000 .543 1.843 
APG -2.961 .702 -.082 -4.217 .000 .463 2.161 
AEF -3.757 .799 -.088 -4.705 .000 .500 1.999 
AFI -4.221 .687 -.125 -6.145 .000 .423 2.362 
AAT -.682 .766 -.016 -.891 .373 .544 1.837 
AVA -3.456 1.046 -.051 -3.303 .001 .727 1.375 
AVJ -.065 .704 -.002 -.093 .926 .460 2.173 
BLT -2.051 .896 -.037 -2.288 .022 .661 1.513 
BYI -2.410 .707 -.067 -3.406 .001 .456 2.194 
BNO -2.135 .775 -.050 -2.755 .006 .531 1.881 
BTC -1.849 1.074 -.027 -1.721 .085 .690 1.449 
BKL -2.307 .722 -.064 -3.197 .001 .438 2.283 
CDL -2.153 .906 -.039 -2.377 .018 .648 1.544 
CDP -.400 .766 -.009 -.522 .602 .544 1.839 
CCK -4.775 1.042 -.071 -4.583 .000 .734 1.363 
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CWP -1.244 .821 -.026 -1.515 .130 .591 1.691 
LHG 3.414 1.032 .051 3.309 .001 .748 1.337 
UTB -.406 .732 -.010 -.554 .579 .496 2.014 
TEL 2.271 .819 .048 2.773 .006 .594 1.683 
TCL 4.677 1.035 .069 4.520 .000 .744 1.345 
TAH 2.360 .729 .061 3.238 .001 .501 1.997 
PRK 3.318 .729 .085 4.553 .000 .501 1.997 
PBL 2.675 .775 .063 3.450 .001 .531 1.885 
MCW 2.540 .730 .065 3.480 .001 .499 2.003 
MBL 3.529 .729 .090 4.842 .000 .501 1.997 
IPG 3.225 .734 .083 4.392 .000 .493 2.027 
GAN 2.958 .729 .076 4.059 .000 .501 1.997 
DVC 1.774 .729 .045 2.434 .015 .501 1.997 
CTX 2.942 .820 .062 3.590 .000 .593 1.686 
CML 3.052 .772 .071 3.951 .000 .535 1.870 
BIL 2.608 .815 .055 3.199 .001 .600 1.668 
ALN .831 .778 .019 1.068 .286 .527 1.896 
AGL 1.916 .730 .049 2.626 .009 .500 2.001 
CST -2.808 1.039 -.042 -2.704 .007 .738 1.355 
CLT -.783 .729 -.020 -1.073 .283 .501 1.998 
CNT .587 .815 .012 .720 .472 .601 1.665 
CWG -3.429 .893 -.062 -3.842 .000 .667 1.500 
CHR -3.524 .764 -.082 -4.610 .000 .546 1.831 
CHP -3.722 .815 -.078 -4.568 .000 .600 1.666 
CHF -.825 .765 -.019 -1.079 .281 .546 1.832 
CXS -1.124 .819 -.024 -1.373 .170 .595 1.682 
CAL -1.430 .764 -.033 -1.871 .062 .546 1.831 
CCE -3.437 1.380 -.036 -2.491 .013 .836 1.196 
CDA -1.457 .898 -.026 -1.623 .105 .659 1.518 
CFR -3.347 .893 -.061 -3.749 .000 .666 1.501 
CGO -3.597 .730 -.092 -4.929 .000 .500 2.002 
CHO .498 .681 .015 .731 .465 .430 2.325 
CHQ -1.205 .764 -.028 -1.577 .115 .546 1.830 
CIR -.515 .764 -.012 -.674 .501 .546 1.831 
CKR -1.222 .764 -.029 -1.599 .110 .546 1.831 
CLH -1.309 .764 -.031 -1.713 .087 .546 1.831 
CLK -2.362 .894 -.043 -2.641 .008 .664 1.506 
CLO .406 .767 .010 .529 .597 .542 1.846 
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CLV -2.964 .815 -.062 -3.637 .000 .600 1.666 
CLX -2.557 .893 -.046 -2.865 .004 .667 1.500 
CMI -.668 .765 -.016 -.873 .383 .545 1.833 
CMP -3.602 1.031 -.053 -3.493 .000 .749 1.335 
CMS -4.839 1.370 -.051 -3.533 .000 .848 1.179 
CMW -.781 .815 -.016 -.958 .338 .600 1.666 
CNA 1.860 .898 .034 2.071 .038 .659 1.518 
CND -1.119 .692 -.033 -1.617 .106 .417 2.400 
CNF -4.237 1.364 -.044 -3.105 .002 .855 1.170 
WPL 3.086 .709 .085 4.350 .000 .453 2.206 
TCL 4.082 .911 .074 4.480 .000 .640 1.563 
OSH 2.564 .732 .066 3.505 .000 .497 2.013 
ARG 2.516 .691 .074 3.644 .000 .419 2.388 
CUO -1.057 .893 -.019 -1.184 .237 .666 1.501 
DOM -1.336 .764 -.031 -1.749 .080 .547 1.829 
GDY .165 .764 .004 .216 .829 .546 1.831 
GNC .941 .817 .020 1.152 .249 .597 1.674 
IMD -1.326 .818 -.028 -1.620 .105 .595 1.680 
MAE -.937 1.038 -.014 -.903 .367 .739 1.353 
NDO -1.064 .893 -.019 -1.192 .234 .666 1.501 
OMH 1.450 .820 .030 1.767 .077 .592 1.689 
SGM 1.527 .681 .045 2.241 .025 .430 2.325 
Y2001 -.067 .134 -.009 -.504 .615 .541 1.847 
Y2002 -.048 .129 -.007 -.369 .712 .507 1.971 
Y2003 .134 .127 .020 1.056 .291 .480 2.085 
Y2004 .458 .122 .074 3.743 .000 .446 2.244 
Y2005 .677 .124 .108 5.452 .000 .444 2.251 
Y2006 .980 .129 .147 7.603 .000 .467 2.143 
Y2007 1.384 .127 .214 10.910 .000 .454 2.203 
a. Dependent Variable: lnite 
 
 
 
Model Summary
b
 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .858
a
 .736 .674 1.26129 
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ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
1 Regression 6698.608 354 18.923 11.895 .000
a
 
Residual 2399.003 1508 1.591   
Total 9097.611 1862    
 
 
 
 
Residuals Statistics
a
 
 Minimu
m 
Maximu
m 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
N 
Predicted Value 11.9475 23.2946 17.3749 1.89672 1863 
Std. Predicted Value -2.861 3.121 .000 1.000 1863 
Standard Error of 
Predicted Value 
.452 1.261 .542 .099 1863 
Adjusted Predicted Value 11.2516 24.0491 17.3820 1.91995 1857 
Residual -5.40675 3.97027 .00000 1.13508 1863 
Std. Residual -4.287 3.148 .000 .900 1863 
Stud. Residual -4.807 3.541 .000 1.004 1863 
Deleted Residual -6.79967 5.17124 -.00007 1.42186 1857 
Stud. Deleted Residual -4.843 3.554 .000 1.007 1857 
Mahal. Distance 238.055 1861.000 353.810 157.113 1863 
Cook's Distance .000 .017 .001 .002 1857 
Centered Leverage Value .128 .999 .190 .084 1863 
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Casewise Diagnostics
a
 
Case Number Std. Residual lnite Predicted 
Value 
Residual 
302 -3.969 12.46 17.4663 -5.00562 
383 -3.111 9.47 13.3959 -3.92324 
555 -4.215 13.06 18.3771 -5.31665 
995 -3.359 14.08 18.3147 -4.23687 
1292 3.058 20.81 16.9507 3.85650 
1404 -3.209 11.96 16.0104 -4.04729 
1648 3.148 19.80 15.8262 3.97027 
1861 -3.968 13.46 18.4631 -5.00425 
2217 -4.287 11.39 16.7955 -5.40675 
2294 -3.518 11.35 15.7882 -4.43780 
2444 -3.316 14.29 18.4679 -4.18242 
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